

Infantry

May-August 2010

Mountain Operations



FLARE

MG MICHAEL FERRITER
Commanding General,
Maneuver Center of Excellence


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FRONT COVER:

Soldiers with B Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment scan a valley in the Zabul Province of Afghanistan on 21 February 2009. (Photo by SSG Adam Mancini)

**BACK COVER:**

Soldiers with D Company, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, discuss their movement to the objective during a mission in Khowst Province, Afghanistan, on 5 April 2010. (Photo by SGT Jeffrey Alexander)

This medium is approved for official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

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Infantry

MAY-AUGUST 2010

Volume 99, Number 2

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Commanding General's Note

MG MICHAEL FERRITER

DEVELOPING THE MANEUVER FORCE FOR WIDE AREA SECURITY AND COMBINED ARMS MANEUVER

This month, the Maneuver Center of Excellence will host the Infantry Warfighting Conference at the Iron Works Trade and Convention Center, approximately five miles from Fort Benning in downtown Columbus, Ga. This year's Conference theme is "Developing the Maneuver Force for Wide Area Security and Combined Arms Maneuver."

The leaders of our maneuver force continue to face broad ranges of threats and conditions of uncertainty in complex environments. Our leaders must be skilled in conducting sustained decentralized operations to defeat enemy forces. Units must be able to defeat forces, consolidate gains, secure populations, land and resources, and set the conditions for future operations. Units need to be strategically and tactically mobile, versatile, networked, and enabled with both lethal and non-lethal capabilities to defeat hostile forces while simultaneously influencing and securing the population, supporting local organizations and governments to achieve the commander's objectives.

This operational environment will present our forces with complex and challenging conditions. Much as it does today, it will include hybrid threats ranging from criminals and private militias to military formations experienced in close fighting who are well equipped, well led, well trained and dedicated to their cause. This combination of fighting a determined enemy while at the same time securing the population will challenge our formations.

To address this threat the Maneuver Center is developing the future movement and maneuver warfighting concept. It includes combined arms maneuver and wide area security operations.

• Combined arms maneuver is the application of the elements of combat power in a complementary and reinforcing manner to achieve physical, temporal, or psychological advantages over the enemy, preserve freedom of action, and exploit success.

• Wide area security is the application of the elements of combat power in coordination with other military and civilian capabilities to develop the situation

through action, gain or maintain contact with the enemy and to deny the enemy positions of advantage. The intent is to protect forces, populations, infrastructure, activities and consolidate tactical and operational gains to set conditions for achieving strategic and policy goals.

Several articles in this edition complement the discussion of combined arms maneuver and wide area security in a difficult environment. LTC (Retired) Lester Grau offers an excellent piece on the Russians' mountain reconnaissance techniques and how much the guerrillas learned from observing them. Another article focuses on cultural awareness and talks to influencing the population through information operations, key leader engagements, and the use of interpreters. Still other authors address high-altitude mountain warfare, teaching troop leading procedures to Afghan company commanders, the critical effect civilian casualties have on lines of effort, and evolution of combat casualty care as it is reflected in the Ranger First Responder Program.

The articles in this issue highlight some of the conditions in the current operational environment that have guided our study and thoughts about the future battlefield. As you read these articles, either in hard copy or on the Fort Benning Web site, we welcome your comments and suggestions. I encourage you to contact the Editor directly at russell.eno@us.army.mil. Your input and the articles that you submit for future publication will ensure a robust dialogue and those lessons learned and better ways of doing our job will reach Soldiers as quickly as possible. One force, one fight!





OEF VETERANS NEEDED FOR FM DEVELOPMENT

Have you fought in the mountains of Afghanistan? If you have, the chief of Doctrine for the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) would like to invite you to help capture the hard-won lessons you learned there and provide them for others to use in the future.

The MCoE is developing a field manual on small-unit tactical operations in the mountains. This project will build on the information in *Infantry Company Fighting in the Mountains* (a field circular prepared by the Infantry School in 1985) and from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 09-37, *Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan*. Publications for mountaineering techniques, rappelling, climbing and cold weather general subject matter are all available now, but tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) on how platoons and companies should fight on mountainous terrain are rare.

Experienced contract and military doctrine writers, CALL, the Asymmetric Warfare Group, and the Combined Arms Center are presently working on this new publication. Research supporting its development comes from the experiences of the U.S. Army in Italy and Korea. It also includes Soviet operations in Afghanistan and the British Frontier Forces of India. The doctrine writers have also reached out to NATO allies for their experiences and thoughts on this subject.

This manual is intended to be written with a "Boots-on-the-Granite" focus. It will be used by brigade planners, but the primary audience is small-unit leaders at the troops-in-contact level of squad leader to battalion commander.

Anyone wishing to share experiences or to provide TTPs on small-unit operations in the mountains should e-mail Curtis Archuleta at curtis.archuleta@us.army.mil. He can also be reached at (706) 545-7114.

Those interested in providing feedback can also be added to a mailing list to receive a draft of the manual and offer comments, recommendations, and feedback directly to the manual's authors.

Become part of the solution and help write doctrine for the future!

SUBTLE SUICIDE BEHAVIOR OCCURS FREQUENTLY BUT IS HARDER TO DETECT

CHAPLAIN (MAJ) TAMMIE CREWS

Historically, research and treatment of suicide have concentrated on overt suicide, a creator of such tragic circumstances for all concerned. Nonetheless, subtle suicide is a more passive and difficult behavior and thinking pattern to detect which occurs more frequently. Therefore, it should be a focus of concern when considering the full spectrum of suicide.

Consider the statistics on self-destructive thinking and behaviors:

- * More than five million Americans suffer from eating disorders;
- * About 2 percent of our population suffers from pathological gambling;
- * About 10 percent of individuals are responsible for 50 percent of alcohol consumption in this country;
- * Drug abuse is estimated at 6 percent of the overall population;
- * About 20 percent of college students admit to suicidal ideations during their college time; and
- * The lifetime occurrence of clinical depression is between 10 and 25 percent for women and between 5 and 12 percent for men.

Further, 8 to 9 percent of teenagers admit to engaging in self-destructive behaviors; certain personality disorders involve self-destructive behaviors; and millions of Americans smoke cigarettes, a habit which is known to shorten life.

On a more personal note, you may have felt the helplessness of caring for a loved one or someone close to you who seems to adopt a "who cares?" attitude about life. I recently read a book on the topic of caring for those who have given up on life which I found to be quite thought provoking. The book, *Subtle Suicide: Our Silent Epidemic of Ambivalence about Living*, was written by Michael Church and Charles Brooks and published by Praeger Press in 2009. The introduction begins, "We all know people who are 'living on the edge' and, at the same time, wasting their lives...One way or another, we have become aware of their risky behaviors, self-neglect, carelessness, and negative mood states. Sometimes we hear them express pessimistic and depressive thoughts and beliefs. In these persons, we observe a huge waste of human potential. Worse, even tragically, we see people who become sick more frequently than most, and who may die prematurely or suddenly as a result of their self-defeating actions."

The authors define subtle suicide as "a pattern of self-destructive feelings, thoughts, and behaviors that take place over a substantial period of time and significantly reduce the quality and possibly the length of an individual's life." The emphasis is not so much on the

shortening of life but on the significantly diminished quality of life; individuals suffering from subtle suicide are sometimes called “the living dead.”

Some of the characteristics of subtle suicide include:

(1) A series of conscious or unconscious patterns of risky behaviors that are self-defeating and self-destructive. This is more than the odd bad habit or addiction; it is a pattern rooted in a deep desire to self-destruct.

(2) An intense ambivalence about living. There is an internal conflict between desperately wanting to live while simultaneously wanting to die.

(3) Anyone at any age is vulnerable. The onset can be gradual or sudden.

(4) There is no single cause. Virtually any overwhelming or threatening experience can be a potential cause.

(5) A variable course. The duration of the symptoms depends on factors such as the availability and accessibility of support systems, genetic constitution, and the effectiveness of the professional intervention.

(6) A long-term pattern. Subtle suicide is more than a brief reaction to acute stress or loss; it is a way of life over an extended period of time where the individual stops caring about his/her life in many important ways which reduce the quality and possibly the length of life.

(7) A self-defeating spiral. Subtle desires to die and to avoid pain can become prominent enough to allow habits like carelessness, inattention to personal care, and self-destructive acts to become a way of life so that eventually, the patterns of self-defeat become habitual and chronic.

(8) Condition may not be readily apparent to others. The individual may be deceptive to others about what is actually going on and how he really feels.

(9) The effects may be considerably delayed. Life habits such as drugs, alcohol, self-mutilation, eating disorders, failure to follow prescriptions, unsafe driving, etc., may take years to catch up with the individual.


(10) Intense negative feelings and thoughts. Typically, those who suffer from subtle suicide also suffer from low self-esteem, a pessimistic outlook, intense shame and/or guilt, an inability to cope with anger and forgiveness, a high degree of depression and/or anxiety, lack of purpose, etc.

(11) Alienation of others. The individual's self-defeating behaviors and lack of motivation to change frustrate and alienate family, friends, coworkers, and even professional providers.

Protection from subtle suicide includes the following coping skills:

- * Having a positive support system,
- * Feeling competent and confident to meet daily life challenges,
- * Developing a sense of purpose and meaning in life,
- * Being able to have meaningful and lasting connections with others,
- * Feeling hopeful about living and the future,
- * Having a generally positive self-concept, and
- * Being relatively free from intense physical pain and psychological trauma (or where the latter is part of an individual's history to have worked through those issues).

When providing intervention for an individual suffering from subtle suicide, keep in mind that the person has quit life; persistence



is the key for helping individuals suffering from subtle suicide. The following guidelines are provided for intervention with those experiencing subtle suicide:

- (1) Recognize the problem;
- (2) Listen to the sufferer's comments without being critical or judgmental;
- (3) Demonstrate to the individual how important he is to you and how much he means to you;
- (4) Remember the person is responsible for his own actions; therefore do not indulge, enable, or protect him from his inappropriate actions;
- (5) Avoid oversimplifying the situation by incorrectly attributing the subtle suicide condition to a disease, addiction, psychological disorder, or lack of will-power;
- (6) Assist the sufferer in going behind the symptoms to discover the deeper core conflicts;
- (7) Avoid telling the person what he should or should not do;
- (8) Guide the individual toward expressing his choices rather than pointing out alternatives;
- (9) Avoid stereotyping;
- (10) Remember diagnostic labels are not solutions or permission to be “sick” or “dysfunctional;”
- (11) Psychotropic medications help manage conditions, not cure them;
- (12) Assist the individual to find the right therapist;
- (13) For the caregiver, remember success is not guaranteed and it is not about you.

(Chaplain [MAJ] Tammie Crews is the post chaplain at Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pa.)



27th annual
David E. Grange Jr.

BEST RANGER COMPETITION



The 27th annual David E. Grange Jr. Best Ranger Competition was held on Fort Benning, Ga., May 7-9.

The competition tests Rangers' ability to shoot, move, and communicate under extreme conditions, said LTC Kevin Brill, Ranger Training Brigade's operations officer.

More than 40 two-man teams began the quest for the title of Best Ranger, but only 25 can say they were able to complete the ultimate Army competition.

"It's kind of like the Super Bowl, the World Series, the Daytona 500, and the World Cup for the Army and the Ranger community," said CSM Dennis Smith, Ranger Training Brigade command sergeant major. "Just to finish it is saying a lot. These competitors are the best of the best."

The competition started with a four-mile buddy run, a 250-meter swim, and another three-mile run to their first obstacle course. Following the urban obstacle course, teams had to navigate their way across the camp to firing ranges to conduct a series of weapons skills events before moving out again on another buddy run. The day ended with a spot jump and concluded with an unknown distance foot march.

The grueling first day of events, which had teams traveling more than 30 miles, eliminated nearly half of the competitors. Only 26 teams began the second day's events of completing Ranger skills stations that included rappelling, rope climbs, first aid, hand grenades and additional weapons skills challenges. The day ended with an overnight orienteering, or land navigation, course.

Day three began with the Darby Queen, an obstacle course laid out on a

At left, the winning team of MSG Eric Tnrk and MSG Eric Ross cross the finish line of the competition's final event, a buddy run. At top, a competitor reaches for the Ranger tab before dropping into Victory Pond as part of the water confidence course on the third day of the competition. (Photos by John Helms)

2010 Final Standings

1st: Team 6 — MSG Eric Turk / MSG Eric Ross, US Special Operations Command
2nd: Team 5 — MSG Kevin Quant / SSG George Sankey, US Special Operations Command
3rd: Team 7 — SGM James Moran / MSG Evert Solderholm, US Special Operations Command
4th: Team 21 — SGT Jesse Collins / SGT Michael Malchow, 75th Ranger Regiment
5th: Team 16 — CPT Jeremy Shute / SFC Jared Sarten, 4th Ranger Training Battalion
6th: Team 25 — SSG Charles Cogle / SGT Frank Horbay, 75th Ranger Regiment
7th: Team 33 — 1LT Kevin Alger / CPT Joseph Dechauny, 199th Infantry BDE
8th: Team 3 — CPT Kevin Toth / MSG Joshua King, 5th Special Forces Group
9th: Team 37 — CPT Derrick Anderson / SSG Christopher Malone, 3rd Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard)
10th: Team 41 — CPT Robert May / 1SG Kevin Dylus, NC ARNG
11th: Team 23 — SSG Eugene Mirador / SGT Jeremy Billings, 75th Ranger Regiment
12th: Team 22 — SFC William Greenwood / SFC Gerald McKinny, 75th Ranger Regiment
13th: Team 19 — SSG Thomas West / SFC Jose Magana, 6th RTB
14th: Team 40 — CPT Christopher Ahlemeyer / SSG Robert Tobin, RI ARNG
15th: Team 20 — SSG Kyle Skaggs / SSG Michael Ayotte, 6th RTB
16th: Team 17 — SFC James Anderson / SFC Larry Forrest, 4th RTB
17th: Team 9 — SSG Keith Bach / SGT Anthony Vasquez, 3rd Infantry Division
18th: Team 29 — CPT Luke Bandi / CPT Ashton Ballesteros, 199th Infantry BDE
19th: Team 26 — SSG Wilton Gleaton / SPC Cristob Cruz, 75th Ranger Regiment
20th: Team 27 — CPT Adam Patten / CPT Darrell Fawley, 199th Infantry BDE
21st: Team 18 — CPT Andrew Smith / CPT Aaron Chonko, 5th RTB
22nd: Team 39 — SFC Vernon Kenworthy / SFC Justin Brekken, Human Resources Command
23rd: Team 10 — SSG Warren Cash / SSG Danny Shedd, 3rd Infantry Division
24th: Team 34 — CPT Owen Broom / CPT Mark Breugem, 199th Infantry BDE
25th: Team 44 — CPT John Campbell / 1LT Matthew Schachman, 25th Infantry Division

Top right, a Best Ranger competitor climbs a tower as part of the second day of events. Bottom right, a team jumps into Victory Pond during the helocast event on the third and last day of the competition.

one-mile route. Upon completion of the course, teams constructed a poncho raft for use in the Helocast event. The Helocast event took the teams and their poncho raft over a pond and dropped them. Teams were required to utilize their poncho raft and swim to shore. The day finished with a water confidence test, canoe race, and the final buddy run to the finish line.

“Over the past three days the competitors covered more than 60 miles on foot for over 60 hours without sleep, and very little food intake,” said CPT John Vickery, project officer for Best Ranger. “All those teams that completed the competition are really, really good teams. They represented their units well.”

MSG Eric Turk and MSG Eric Ross, who represented the U.S. Special Operations Command, captured first. Two other U.S. Special Operations Command teams came in second and third places. MSG Kevin Quant and SSG George Sankey placed second while SGM James Moran and MSG Evert Solderholm took third.

(This article was adapted from an article by S.L. Standifird, a journalist with the Joint Hometown News Service.)



MCOE RELEASES UPDATED READING LIST

Fully Support the Army at War

* *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* — Steve Coll

* *The Good Soldiers* — David Finkel

* *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* — David Galula

* *Blink: The Power of Thinking without Thinking* — Malcolm Gladwell

* *Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* — USMC COL Thomas X. Hammes

* *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* — Seth G. Jones

* *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* — David Kilcullen

* *Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy* — Steven Metz

* *On Guerrilla Warfare* — Mao Tse-tung

* *Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda* — Sean Naylor

* *The Age of the Unthinkable: Why the New World Disorder Constantly Surprises Us and What We Can Do About It* — Joshua Cooper Ramo

* *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* — Ahmed Rashid

* *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008* — Thomas E. Ricks

* *War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age* — Thomas Rid and Marc Hecker

* *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century* — P.W. Singer

* *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* — Roger Trinquier

Develop Army Future Capabilities; Prepare for the Future (Military History & Heritage)

* *Eagles and Empire: The United States, Mexico, and the Struggle for a Continent* — David A. Clary

* *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940* — Robert Allan Doughty

* *The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan* — Gregory Feifer

* *Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918* — Bruce I. Gudmundsson

* *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865* — Robert R. Mackey

* *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* — Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski

* *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918* — Martin Samuels

* *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa* — E.B. Sledge

* *Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945* — Martin Van Creveld

* *The Transformation of War* — Martin Van Creveld

* *If You Survive* — George Wilson

* *Air Commandos against Japan: Allied Special Operations in World War II Burma* — William T. Y'Blood

* *Infantry in Battle: From Somalia to the Global War on Terror* — U.S. Army Infantry School

Operate in a Command Climate of Teamwork, Discipline, Standards and Safety

* *Creating Magic: 10 Common Sense Leadership Strategies from a Life at Disney* — Lee Cockerell

* *Once an Eagle* — Anton Myrer

* *Managing Ignatius: The Lunacy of Lucky Dogs and Life in the Quarter* — Jerry E. Strahan

* *No Asshole Rule: Building a Civilized Workplace and Surviving one that Isn't* — Robert I. Sutton

* *Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything* — Don Tapscott and Anthony D. Williams

* *Hesselbein on Leadership* — Frances Hesselbein

Demonstrate Inspired Leadership (Professionalism & Leadership)

* *Principles of War* — Carl Von Clausewitz

* *The Echo of Battle: The Army's War of War* — Brian McAllister Linn

* *Dune* — Frank Herbert

* *Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat* — James R. McDonough

* *We Were Soldiers Once ... And Young: Ia Drang, the Battle that Changed the War in Vietnam* — LTG (Retired) Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway

* *To Hell and Back* — Audie Murphy

* *The Unforgiving Minute: A Soldier's Education* — Craig M. Mullaney

* *No Quarter: The Battle of the Crater, 1864* — Richard Slotkin

* *The Art of War* — Sun Tzu

Enhance Quality of Life for our Soldiers and Army Families

* *Chicken Soup for the Military Wife's Soul: Stories to Touch the Heart and Rekindle the Spirit* — Jack Canfield, Mark Victor Hansen, Charles Preston, and Cindy Pedersen

* *Today's Military Wife: Meeting the*

Challenges of Service Life — Lydia Sloan Cline

* *Help! I'm a Military Spouse - I Get a Life Too!: How to Craft a Life For You as You Move With The Military* — Kathie Hightower and Holly Scherer

* *Life after Deployment: Military Families Share Reunion Stories and Advice* — Karen M. Pavlicin

Fully Transition to the MCoE

* *Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make the Leap ... and Others Don't* — Jim Collins

* *Talent Is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else* — Geoff Colvin

* *The Five Most Important Questions You Will Ever Ask About Your Organization* — Drucker Foundation

* *Leading Change* — John P. Kotter

* *The Power of Alignment: How Great Companies Stay Centered and Accomplish Extraordinary Things* — George Labovitz and Victor Rosansky

* *Hope Is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn From America's Army* — GEN (Retired) Gordon R. Sullivan and Michael V. Harper

Cultural Awareness

* *My Clan against the World: U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994* — Robert Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington

* *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* — Romeo Dallaire

* *Book of Peoples of the World: A Guide to Cultures* — edited by Wade Davis and K. David Harrison with Catherin Herbert Howell

* *Abraham: A Journey to the Heart of Three Faiths* — Bruce Feiler

* *After the Prophet: The Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split in Islam* — Lesley Hazleton

* *In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian, and American Occupation* — David Loyn

* *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* — Allan R. Millett

* *Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission To Fight Terrorism and Build Nations - One School At A Time* — Greg Mortenson and David Oliver Relin

* *Hezbollah: A Short History* — Augustus Richard Norton

* *The Arab Mind* — Raphael Patai

* *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* — Ahmed Rashid

* *Children at War* — P.W. Singer

* *A Study of History* — Arnold J. Toynbee

INFANTRY WARFIGHTING CONFERENCE SET FOR 13-15 SEPTEMBER

"Developing The Maneuver Force For Wide Area Security And Combined Arms Maneuver"

The 2010 Infantry Warfighting Conference will be held 13-15 September at the Iron Works Trade and Convention Center in Columbus, Ga. The conference will primarily focus on efforts with the Infantry, as well as showcase the

Maneuver Force. Some of the Army's top leadership will give presentations that will provide a basis for opportunities to share lessons learned, tactics, techniques and procedures from across the operating force, deployed environments, generating force and training

centers. There will also be an update in the progress in establishing the Maneuver Center of Excellence and an update from the Armor School. For more information or to register, visit the conference Web site at <https://www.benning.army.mil/iwc/2010>.



TENTATIVE CONFERENCE AGENDA

Monday, 13 September

5 a.m. to 4 p.m. — Senior NCO Program, Fort Benning

7:30-8:50 a.m. — NIA Golf Scramble Registration and Breakfast, Golf Club, Fort Benning

8 a.m. to 6 p.m. — Travel and Registration, Ironworks Convention Center (IWCC)

9 a.m. to 3 p.m. — NICA Golf Scramble Shotgun Start*

*Not part of the official agenda, no command endorsement of this event is implied

6-9 p.m. — Icebreaker Reception (Casual), National Infantry Museum

Tuesday, 14 September

8:15-8:25 a.m. — Admin Remarks, Main Auditorium (MA), IWCC

8:25-9 a.m. — MCOE Welcome & Update, MA, IWCC

9-9:30 a.m. — Infantry State of Branch, MA, IWCC

9:30-10 a.m. — Armor State of Branch, MA, IWCC

10-10:10 a.m. — Break

10:10-10:40 a.m. — U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence Update, MA, IWCC

10:40-10:50 a.m. — Break

10:50-11:20 a.m. — U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Update, MA, IWCC

11:20-11:30 a.m. — Break

11:30-noon — Army Update, MA, IWCC

Noon to 1 p.m. — Senior Leader Session, Room 205, IWCC or CSM Luncheon, Sycamore Room B/D, IWCC

1-1:10 p.m. — Break

1:10-1:55 p.m. — TRADOC Update, MA, IWCC

1:55-2:05 p.m. — Break

2:05-2:50 p.m. — FORSCOM Update, MA, IWCC

2:50-3 p.m. — Break

3-3:45 p.m. — Keynote Speaker, MA, IWCC

3:45-3:55 p.m. — Break

3:55-4:40 p.m. — Theme-supporting Speaker, MA, IWCC

6:30-7:15 p.m. — Doughboy Awards Dinner Cocktail Hour, Sycamore Room, IWCC

7:30-8:30 p.m. — Doughboy Awards Dinner — Awardees: MG (Retired) Jerry White and CSM (Retired) Andrew McFowler, Dining Gallery, IWCC (Coat and Tie)

Wednesday, 15 September (all events at IWCC)

8:30- 9:15 a.m. — Keynote Speaker, MA

9:15-9:35 a.m. — Break

9:35 -10:20 a.m. — Theme-supporting Speaker, MA

10:20-10:40 a.m. — Break

10:40 -11:25 a.m. — Forcible Entry/Denied Access Ops, MA

11:25 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. — Break

1-1:40 p.m.

HBCTs in Full Spectrum Operations (OIF), MA

IBCTs in Full Spectrum Operations (OEF), Dining Gallery

SBCTs in Full Spectrum Operations (OEF), Sycamore Room

BfSBs in Full Spectrum Operations (OIF), Foundry Room

1:50-2:30 p.m.

HBCT Speaker TBD, Foundry Room

IBCT Speaker, 4th Brigade, 4th ID, MA

SBCT Speaker, 5th Brigade, 2nd ID, Dining Gallery

BfSB Speaker TBD, Sycamore Room

2:40-3:20 p.m.

HBCT Briefing Team, Sycamore Room

IBCT Briefing Team, Foundry Room

SBCT Briefing Team, MA

BfSB Briefing Team, Dining Gallery

3:30-4:10 p.m.

HBCT Briefing Team, Dining Gallery

IBCT Briefing Team, Sycamore Room

SBCT Briefing Team, Foundry Room

BfSB Briefing Team, MA

4:20-4:45 p.m. — Closing Remarks, MCOE Commander, MA



INFLUENCING THE POPULATION

Using Interpreters, Conducting KLEs, and Executing IO in Afghanistan

CPT MICHAEL G. CUMMINGS

Before deploying to Afghanistan with the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, I was trained to plan and lead combat missions during training courses such as the Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger School. Whether I was attacking an enemy patrol, bunker or logistics center, the task was always the same: destroy. But when I deployed, I didn't get to destroy things on every patrol ... far from it. In Afghanistan I attempted to *influence the population*.

When I first heard the phrase *influence the population* I thought, "How does that help me?" How does that vague term help a small unit leader — either platoon leader or company commander — on the ground?

Every leader needs to understand that in a counterinsurgency, destroying is not as important as influencing. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, describes an insurgency as a struggle between two fighting minorities for the "uncommitted middle." Doctrinally, we call this Information Operations (IO). IO is the set of tools that influences that "uncommitted middle." IO drives all our operations from security to training local security forces to distributing humanitarian assistance.

Still, to help the small unit leader, we need to move from the vague sounding "Information Operations" to actionable tips. This article hopes to provide those tips and to act as a short resource for developing a platoon or company-level IO campaign focused on the Afghanistan theater. First, I will give advice for using an interpreter — your lifeline to local Afghans. Next, I will give tips and techniques for conducting key leader engagements (KLEs) — the most used tool in IO. Finally, I will give tips on developing an IO campaign at the platoon level.

My experience is a deployment to Konar Province, Afghanistan during OEF VIII. Therefore, the majority of my advice centers on



Photos courtesy of author

During a shura, the author (left) addresses the elders from Pashad, Afghanistan. Key leader engagements are one of the best ways to distribute Information Operation themes.

Pashtun culture and may not apply to Iraq or other ethnicities in Afghanistan. I wrote this article as a guide for platoon leaders who have never deployed, but it could assist any Soldier in Afghanistan.

Interpreters: Your Lifeline to Afghanistan

A U.S. dignitary created a mini-controversy last summer when he made a gaffe in Afghanistan. While meeting with local nationals, the official made a comment about one man's daughter — "She is very beautiful." While the comment is perfectly harmless in America, in Afghanistan he crossed the line. I don't blame the official, though. His interpreter should never have translated that comment.

Before you can influence the population, you must communicate

with it; your interpreter is your only connection to the Afghan population.

An interpreter can do one of two things. On one hand, he can simply translate what you say into Pashtun or Dari. On the other hand, he can *interpret* what you say into the local language, phrasing it as accurately and appropriately as possible. He can also act as a cultural advisor, a subject matter expert on Afghanistan, a lie detector, an intelligence source, and an IO theme coordinator. The interpreter is an underutilized resource; try not to make this mistake.

Working With Your Interpreter.

Treat your interpreter as if he were your own Soldier. This means providing him with food, shelter, and security. Make sure he gets paid on time, is fed regularly, and has a place to sleep.

The interpreter occupies a special place in the platoon. He isn't just a new addition, he is a new addition who works directly for you. He reports to you the way a squad leader reports to you. Therefore, you must counsel and mentor him.

Counsel your interpreter on a regular basis. When he arrives, give him an initial counseling. Let him know your standards and all the tasks you expect from him. Let him know he does not merely translate your words, but that he interprets them for the audience. Emphasize how busy he will be, but that you will reward him for his work. Perhaps the best reward for interpreters is a letter of recommendation from you. Be prepared to give him one, but make him earn it. After every patrol, provide specific feedback for him. Bring him to rehearsals and after action reviews (AARs). Demand that he perform every day.

As your relationship develops with your interpreter, you will learn how much you can trust him. He most likely will not have a security clearance, but you will rely on him for many sensitive subjects. If at any time you question his integrity, replace him. Open communication is the key to trusting your interpreter.

Use Your Interpreter in a Variety of Roles.

Once you have laid down the ground rules to your interpreter, get as much use out of the interpreter as you can. He is not just your mouthpiece or translator — he is your guide to Afghan culture.

An interpreter knows more about Afghan

culture than you ever will. Therefore, ask him for feedback about your IO themes. Ask him how well you are respecting Afghan culture. Ask him to explain when you don't understand a local's response to a question or comment.

Use your interpreter to set up shuras on your forward operating base (FOB) or combat outpost (COP). He can provide recommendations on food, and he can set up your shura room.

Have your interpreter act as a lie detector. After meetings, he can tell you who seemed trustworthy and who did not. He'll probably pick up on cultural cues that you may miss.

Your interpreter will run your local cell phone. In most cases, he will answer calls for you. He can also set up meetings with locals. If he knows your IO themes and respects you, he will do this in a heartbeat. My interpreters ran my cell phone towards the end of deployment. Instead of having to have a 10 minute conversation to set the time of day of the next shura, my interpreter would handle the conversation.

Share your interpreter with the platoon. When your Soldiers give a class to Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP) counterparts, have them rehearse with the interpreter.

Your interpreter can also teach your entire platoon basic Dari or Pashtun. Armed with this knowledge, your platoon can then wage IO at the personal level with local Afghans.

Additional tips for using interpreters.

When talking with a local national, speak with him, not the interpreter. Have your interpreter stand to your side, or slightly behind you. He is interpreting your conversation, but the conversation is between you and the local Afghan.

Tell your interpreter to stop you if what he is translating will offend the recipient. It seems simple, but if an interpreter does not like you then he will go ahead and translate inappropriate conversations. When he stops you, provide positive feedback.

Encourage him to ask for clarification about things he does not understand. This will keep him engaged in the conversation. Encourage your interpreter to clarify your points to any locals who misunderstand them. It will save you time.

When writing or assembling patrol debriefs, PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure,

information) reports or target packets, use your interpreter's knowledge. He will remember much more than you. He will also have insights on a local national's body language and subtext.

Get as many interpreters as possible. Even if you have one or two who you work very well with, have more for complex operations. For example, a simple traffic control point (TCP) operation needs a minimum of four interpreters: one to run a KLE with the checkpoint commander, one at each end of the TCP, and one assisting with the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT)/Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE) system. Imagine more complex missions like a cordon and search with the ANA. Get as many interpreters as your unit can afford.

Do not treat interpreters like dirt. I have seen this, and it is disrespectful to the uniform.

Do not think they are inhuman, evil, or any other base stereotype. Stamp out this attitude in your platoon. Afghans can spot insincerity a mile away. Bad attitudes will drive local populations to the Taliban.

Key Leader Engagements: The Bread and Butter of the Small Unit Leader's Soft Skills

KLEs are the most common patrol in Afghanistan or Iraq. Despite their frequency, most young leaders are unprepared to lead them.

Key leader engagements occurred on roughly 90 percent of my platoon's missions. On most of my patrols I conducted more than one KLE. As time went on, I found these patrols were also the best way to distribute IO themes to the locals. No single skill will separate the locals from insurgents like well planned and executed KLEs. As the most effective tool in the IO tool box, a small unit leader must do them well.

The single biggest tip for a successful key leader engagement is to give more than you get. You give support, build relationships, and provide the resources of the U.S. Army so that you may one day get intelligence. Be prepared to talk, talk, and talk some more. An effective KLE respects Afghan culture. The elders of Afghanistan, not the coalition representatives, are the important actors. Therefore, devoting your time, energy and resources to KLEs will not pay off at first.

but over time you will see dramatic results.

Next, study and prepare for a KLE as if it were any other type of combat patrol. Large operations have rehearsals at several levels and so will KLEs. Conducting them systematically will teach you how to respond better to local issues. By studying information about locals, your area of operations and past meetings, you will gather more effective intelligence and make better decisions.

Background.

First, some terms. Our battalion referred to KLEs as any meeting with Afghans, locals, or security forces. I will call any meeting between a platoon leader and one to three other locals a key leader engagement. I use the Pashtun term *shura* to describe large meetings (over a dozen attendees) designed to address district issues. These are usually scheduled on a regular basis and will have the same participants. Finally, my battalion also conducted larger *mega-shuras* (several dozen attendees). These were multi-district events that the provincial governor and battalion commander attended. As a PL, you will mostly attend mega-shuras but will not participate in them.

Second, I would like to caution against assuming that training at mobility readiness exercises (MREs) will adequately prepare a small unit leader to conduct KLEs downrange. MREs have a two-to-three week window to simulate an entire deployment. A platoon leader must meet, introduce himself, develop a relationship and then gain resolution on issues within two weeks. When downrange, meeting all the key leaders of your AO will take two weeks alone, if not more. Further, developing relationships and solving local issues will occur throughout a deployment, not in a set timeline as in an MRE.

Third, to explain a typical KLE experience I will describe some of the engagements I conducted in Afghanistan. On our three-day patrol cycle, I visited two district sub-governors to discuss district-wide issues. At these meetings, I would also conduct a separate engagement with the district chief of police. About once a week, we conducted a larger shura or humanitarian aid distribution with elders somewhere else in the district. Once a month on average, my company commander ran a tri-district shura, which brought together GIRoA (Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) officials and key leaders in our AO.

In the three-day period, we would also conduct security patrols. During the day, we conducted TCPs at ANP police checkpoints. My Soldiers also conducted training with ANA and ANP

soldiers. I would meet with the checkpoint commander to discuss security issues. At night, we conducted coalition force-only movement to contacts. At the end of one of our routes, we checked on ANP checkpoints. I also conducted joint KLEs with ANA soldiers and their Marine trainers at our FOB.

Fourth, I conducted KLEs in a region heavily influenced by the Pashtun-Wali code. This influences many of my recommendations throughout the article. However, understanding the local culture is vital to success no matter what region or country you're operating in.

Before the Key Leader Engagement.

The work begins before you even depart for a key leader engagement. To start, identify a KLE/IO/intelligence team. These are the members of your platoon or company headquarters that will join you on most of your meetings with local nationals. This includes yourself, your RTO (recorder), your forward observer (FO — or whoever coordinates intelligence and IO with you), your interpreter, your platoon sergeant (senior advisor to the platoon leader), your ANA counterpart, and, if possible, your allies in the local Afghan government. Before any KLE you will conduct a rehearsal with these elements to prepare and ensure all participants are on the same page.

Next, study all the relevant information of your AO. At a minimum, review notes from the last KLE, your IO themes, and your AO-specific priority intelligence requirement (PIR). Either before every KLE or at a regularly scheduled meeting, review with your KLE team the environmental situation, atmospherics of the area of operations (the mood or feelings of the village from human collection teams), and battalion IO themes.

After reviewing the background information with your team, brief your team on the specifics of the KLE. Describe who you expect to be there and the specific objectives of the meeting. Have your interpreter back brief your intended IO themes to ensure he



A group of elders from Pashad, Afghanistan gather for a shura with the Serkani district sub-governor. This meeting was the first time in six years a representative from the Government of Afghanistan visited Pashad.

understands them. Answer any questions from your interpreter or your team. Get their opinions on your talking points. Ideally, at the end of the rehearsal, you will have a 3x5 card with the objective of the meeting and your talking points. Finally, spot check your team to make sure they have note pads, pens or pencils, a camera, and any gifts you are bringing.

If you plan on having the KLE at your FOB or COP, set up the shura area. Design it according to Afghan custom with rugs on the floor and pillows. Find funding to provide food at regular shuras. In Afghan culture it is expected to eat food and drink chai. You should provide soda, too (I found that Mountain Dew was popular). As I mentioned above, your interpreters know how to set up an Afghan meeting room. Charge them with this task and make sure it happens.

At the Key Leader Engagement.

If appropriate, bring gifts. Ask your interpreter what he recommends. Simple gifts include weapon lubricant (CLP) to Afghan police checkpoints or school supplies to village elders. For people who often live on a dollar a day, simple gifts can mean a lot. To build up a supply of gifts, find a Web site that adopts Soldiers and tell them you want gifts for the Afghan people, such as toys, school supplies, etc. American citizens want to support our troops; all you have to do is ask. Don't be shy about bringing cigarettes either; cigarettes are a cross-cultural conversation starter.

Expect to be bored, and then fight through it. In the long run, the hours of talk will develop the local government and make your life easier. The best cure against boredom is to know your IO themes and hit them. Know the information you want and ask about it when it is respectful. Know the point you are trying to get to and work towards it. Show interest in the village and concern for its people. Ask questions about the village's history and culture. Remember their answers to demonstrate that you care.

In a shura, minimize the number of Americans who speak. In Afghan culture, only the most respected person speaks. Sometimes, the speaker is not the key elder but his chosen representative. Treat him as if he were. Your FO, RTO and any other coalition force members should allow only the unit leader to speak. It is not a group discussion, but a conversation between two

... every operation is an Information Operation. Every patrol, every battle, every discussion is a chance to persuade the population to support the government, or a chance to turn the population against the government and the coalition.

people that everyone watches. In larger meetings, expect several people to speak but in turn and slowly. I had a forward observer who did not understand this. Whenever he spoke out of turn, it slightly disrespected me.

Acknowledge the awkward situation your presence puts on the elders of Afghanistan. As a 20-something-year-old platoon leader, you will probably be the youngest person at the meeting. You will probably never meet with someone your own age; they are not invited. Accept that you will violate Afghan customs, and then do what you can to be respectful of their culture. This will make your KLEs run smoother.

Expect little progress initially. You will get answers to simple questions (such as how many people live in certain villages) but very little definite support. They will offer assurances but little else. Expect that you will conduct dozens of these over deployment and expect progress to take time.

Taking notes shows you are paying attention and responsive. Even if you have an RTO doing this task, have a notepad ready and use it for your own notes.

After the Key Leader Engagement.

This is a patrol like any other, so conduct regular AARs. Conduct informal AARs directly after small KLEs, then conduct regularly scheduled AARs to brief larger points. The same audience will attend the AAR as attended the rehearsal. Provide feedback to your interpreter, FO, and RTO at these meetings to improve their performance. Use this time to clarify any questions about Afghan culture. Get your interpreter to give you feedback on your performance.

After every patrol, write a patrol debrief covering the KLE. Do not write this in a vacuum. Have your interpreter, FO, RTO and any other relevant sources write up what

they saw, heard and experienced. This will fill in gaps in your memory.

Finally, update any relevant data sources. If locals provided intelligence, pass that to the next larger level's collection system. Update your intelligence on your area of operations. If part of a larger mission or a significant meeting, then write a "good news story" for larger publication.

What not to do.

Do not focus solely on your needs or wants. If the only question you ask is, "Where are the Taliban?" the elders will see you as arrogant. If you only demand for attacks to stop, the elders will view you as powerless. If elders lose respect for you, they will not provide for you.

Do not expect to gather intelligence at a meeting of more than two people. Afghans consider that disrespectful. Don't demand, "Where are the Taliban?" at every meeting. That will not yield results. Build rapport, and intelligence will come slowly over time.

Do not make promises or assurances. Afghans know American rank so they will understand the limits of what a squad leader, platoon leader, or company commander can realistically provide to an AO.

Do not demand a specific resolution to specific problems. Be open to Afghan solutions. Have objectives but not the solution to that objective. If you want to end improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in your AO, ask for their help and see what they can provide. Ask for their solutions. They might provide ANP soldiers or better intelligence. But don't demand they follow your course of action.

Do not strong arm or insult your guests. Calling Afghans liars, cheats, or Taliban will ruin your relationship. They will still seem cordial, but you will have destroyed your relationship.

Afghans do not lie. If questioned, they will try to answer your question as best they can and believe they are not lying. If you put them into a position where they must lie, they will lose respect for you.

Great Information Operations at the Platoon Level

Too often, we think IO involve pamphlets to hand out or billboards to post. If I can convince you of one thing, I would like it to be this: every operation is an Information

Operation. Every patrol, every battle, every discussion is a chance to persuade the population to support the government, or a chance to turn the population against the government and the coalition. Too often IO is considered a battalion function. In the decentralized nature of Afghanistan, every unit that controls an area of operations must conduct its own IO campaign.

To develop a great IO campaign, start with the basics. When you get on the ground, find the previous battalion's IO themes. After touring the AO and getting a feel for the ground, revise them to your needs. Based on your talking points, plan your patrols. If you claim that the government can provide security, then plan security patrols. If you tell elders the government can provide economic benefits, then plan humanitarian assistance deliveries and bring the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) into your area of operations.

Once you have your patrols planned, craft your specific messages. After you conduct your patrols, conduct AARs to determine how well you put out your message. Most importantly, use your patrols to create future IO themes and messages. As you can see, the cycle continues.

The following are additional tips for conducting your intelligence operations at the small unit level:

*** Honesty really is the best policy.**

The only times that you will lose the IO campaign is when you are being dishonest. Honesty might not seem like a big deal, but little white lies will slowly eat away at your message. The best example of exaggerated IO that I have seen concerned Afghan national security forces. We wanted them to take the lead so we tried to put them in as many good news stories as possible. But since they relied on coalition firepower to survive, the message was not as effective as others. Over time, people could see through that embellishment and that may have done more harm than good.

So, for example, if you want to write a good news story about how the ANP took the lead in arresting a known Taliban operative, ask yourself, did they really take the lead? If the locals know that ANP only do joint operations with the U.S., then a story in the local version of the newspaper won't change that. It will be harder to change their minds in the future.

I had this experience as I wrote stories that verged on ridiculous concerning the ANA and ANP. I slowly learned that the more effective stories were true stories. So, I began an IO campaign in both print stories for our battalion — and more importantly via key leader engagement to village elders — about an ANP checkpoint commander who stood up to the Taliban and supported the government. The locals knew he did as well, so I just amplified what they already knew. Over time, the elders gave him and coalition forces more support because we told the truth.

*** Get allies in the local community.**

When I first started IO operations, I acted like the typical brand new PL: I tried to do everything all by myself. Eventually, the district governor and I started communicating. He began coordinating our efforts with the local community and working with me. He introduced me to locals I had no idea existed. Once we started working together on messages, we began communicating a coherent message to the district. The result was much stronger.

I had the same result with the local police chiefs. I distributed a thousand pamphlets to the checkpoints saying, "Don't be corrupt and fight back," but that didn't work. The best technique was having one powerful and honest checkpoint commander influence the rest. He helped me persuade them to conduct better TCPs and to participate in joint operations with ANA. They weren't perfect, but they got better.

*** Information Operations is not a one-man job.**

I made this mistake early, planning Information Operations by myself. The jobs are too large to do by yourself, especially when controlling your own area of operations. Invite your IO team to offer advice and help you craft your message.

Likewise, on patrol your men will interact constantly with locals. Brief your maneuver unit (be it platoon, section or company) on the vital tasks of Information Operations before you leave and do so on a regular basis. Develop platoon-internal IO themes, and then distribute them in nightly meetings. Whenever your patrol stops, have your men prepared to communicate with locals and do whatever they can, no matter how small, to

influence the locals.

*** Include your interpreter.**

We pay them plenty, so use them. You aren't from Afghanistan, they are. Get their opinions and your IO will be that much stronger. When I wrote letters of recommendations for my interpreters, I put joint Information Operations planner in their job description.

Ask your interpreter for themes. Have them brief you on what they think you should say. Discuss the nuances of the words.

Conclusion: The New Way of War

Like Adam and Eve after tasting the forbidden fruit, as a military and as an Army, we cannot go back to the days of simple high-intensity warfare. Killing the enemy will no longer suffice; we must also influence the population that allows those enemies to exist.

Further Reading

* "COIN: On the Job Learning for the New Platoon Leader" by 1LT Robert Baird, January-February 2009, *Infantry Magazine*

* "The Counterinsurgency Cliff Notes: Techniques for the Conventional Rifle Platoon, in Layman's Term" by CPT Craig Coppock, July-August 2008, *Infantry Magazine*

* "An Important Weapon in COIN Operations: The Key Leader's Engagement" CPT Joe Curtis, July-August 2008, *Infantry Magazine*

* "Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency" by David Kilcullen, May-June 2006, *Military Review*

* "The Way of the Pashtun: Pashtunwali" by MAJ Richard Tod Strickland, Vol. 10.3, Fall 2007, *Canadian Army Journal*

* *Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Afghanistan Micro Mission Guide*

* FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

CPT Michael Cummings was commissioned through the UCLA ROTC program in 2006. He deployed with Destined Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry (Airborne), 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team to Konar Province, Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom VIII as a heavy weapons platoon leader. He is currently attending the Military Intelligence Career Course at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

TEACHING TLPs TO AFGHAN COMPANY COMMANDERS

Shaping Afghan Forces Through Hands-On Mentoring

MAJ DAVID H. PARK

Between November 2008 and November 2009, I served as a validator/mentor for the Afghan National Army (ANA). As a member of a Validation Transition Team (VTT), our mission was to observe and assess the ANA in its training and combat operations. Assigned to the Consolidated Fielding Center (CFC) in Pol-e-Charki, Kabul Province, where all new ANA battalions were being formed and trained, VTT-Kabul's specific mission was to conduct the final training exercise for the ANA battalions, certifying them fit for combat. The following article is based on lessons I learned from having assessed 30 Afghan units at the battalion, brigade, and corps levels.

Are Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs) Necessary for Afghanistan?

Coalition forces are not in Afghanistan to build a Mujahideen-style militia. We are in Afghanistan to build a full-spectrum regular Army that can conduct full-blown counterinsurgency operations in the near future. As such, we are to teach them how to plan and how to think, more so than how to fight, which they do fairly well. Many Coalition mentors to the Afghan Army get frustrated at the Afghans for not using proper TLPs and operation orders (OPORDs). Even though the TLP/OPORD process has been a part of the Afghan National Army for at least five years — and many units have adopted its use with great effect — there have been serious problems in regions where ANA units are less developed. In some of these regions, ANA units are not conducting well thought out plans for their combat operations because they are circumventing the mission analysis and course of action development necessary to produce a solid OPORD. If not analyzing the enemy and friendly situation, and higher commander's intent results in an operationally viable plan, it can be considered an "Afghan right." But if such skipping of proper analysis results in faulty planning, forcing ground commanders to make ad hoc decisions on the fly, this method of planning must be identified as "Afghan wrong." The second order effect of not using the OPORD is that the junior leaders get accustomed to not using orders as the accepted custom of the ANA, perpetuating this "Afghan



Photos courtesy of author

An Afghan company commander briefs fellow commanders during operation order training.

wrong." Currently, the Army has contracted civilian instructors to teach the military decision-making process (MDMP) and TLPs simultaneously over a two-week period, centered around PowerPoint slides. I have attended this course with ANA and mentors and can attest that its powerful sleep-inducing qualities do not translate well into knowledge retention for the ANA. In the end, each of the mentor teams must take responsibility in teaching TLPs to its company commanders. If you do not as their mentor, no one will.

The teaching of TLPs is considered time and energy consuming, and many of our mentors are not equipped to teach and coach these procedures. Currently, mentors do not receive specific training on "how to teach" Army systems, such as the production and briefing of the operation order. Mentors are thrown into situations where they have to teach OPORDs without preparation. As mentors for ANA units in combat operations, we cannot make excuses for not being prepared properly. We must simply execute our job. The following is a field-tested method of teaching OPORDs that mentors can use. There are many other methods that have been used, and this method is just one of many such methods. This method produced five company commanders who are able to produce U.S.-standard

company OPORDs in less than one hour, and brief in about 30 minutes, based on a proper battalion-level operations order. This method was conducted at the ANA Central Fielding Center (CFC) while validating 6-4-205th Battalion for deployment to Helmand Province in June 2009. It is designed to be completed in four days, allowing the fifth day of the week for retraining. If being conducted as a part of an actual operation, the sixth day can be used for company-level rehearsals.

Preparing for Class

First, the mentor must prepare for teaching troop leading procedures and operations orders by reviewing the ANA doctrine. ANA FM 7-10 (*Company Operations*) and FM 7-8 volumes 1 and 2 (*Platoon Operations*), which are available in English and Dari through your regional VTT, provide the doctrinal basis for TLPs. Ideally, a captains career course (CCC)-trained CPT or MAJ should teach, but a Ranger-qualified MSG/SFC or a former Ranger Instructor can teach as well. A CCC-trained officer knows how OPORD production/briefing was taught and graded in CCC, and can leverage this experience to teach the ANA.

Secondly, the classroom must be resourced. It should be a quiet room with no disturbances, and the training should be forecasted in the training calendar, as to have no conflicts with other events in the battalion or companies. The following method of teaching takes 20 hours from beginning to completion, to reach minimal U.S. level

of briefing. The classroom should have enough desks and chairs to seat 15 people and have at least two stands for butcher blocks or white boards. A sand table is a plus. Erasable and permanent markers are needed for instruction notes. PowerPoint slides and projectors, which are foreign to Afghan culture, are sleep-inducing and are not recommended.

Thirdly, invite the right people. Only the company commanders should be invited for the initial phase, where paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 are taught. For the second phase where paragraphs 4 and 5 are taught, 1SGs should be invited. Keep the battalion commander and staff out of it, to maintain the focus on company-level leadership, and prevent unwanted command influence from the battalion commander. Bring at least two of your best interpreters. They will not only translate what you say but will translate what the company commanders brief. Since much of the material to be translated is technical, having two interpreters will allow them to help each other as needed. Having worked with more than 30 interpreters, I have found the local interpreters to be better than the U.S.-hired ones, depending on their individual experiences. Provide a pre-translated OPORD format to the interpreters, so they know the right Dari words for all OPORD-related technical terminology.

Last but not least, have as many battalion OPORDs as you can get your hands on. Make sure these orders are written correctly and in Dari. If your battalion does not have any properly written orders, you can get

examples of well-written Dari orders from the VTT-Kabul or the CFC. Make 10 copies of these orders. They will be used for drills.

Conduct of the Class

Afghan company commanders are experienced fighters who have been introduced to OPORDs and TLPs every year by new sets of mentors. We do not need to give them another set of sleep-inducing classes. Just show them what right looks like. Rely on a series of demonstrations and drills where they are to replicate what you have just demonstrated. By showing them what right looks like, asking them to replicate it and then having them brief in front of their peers, you will trigger their sense of honor and competition, keeping them self-motivated throughout the course. Throughout the instruction, begin by briefing to them what a proper order looks like. Use a correct and concise order, simultaneously translated by your best translator. Following this demonstration, have them replicate them under time constraints. Once complete, have each student brief the rest of the class, one at a time. As the students get used to briefing each other, the stronger students will begin coaching the weaker ones, while everyone's confidence will increase. Encourage their mutual coaching, as they can spot and assist each others' weaknesses more than you can through an interpreter.

Troop-Leading Procedures

Do not dwell on all steps of the TLPs during this course. At this level of basic proficiency, rehearsals can be conducted with your direct participation following this process. Focus on these two steps this week:

- * Push out a warning order (WARNO) to the platoon leaders within 15 minutes of receiving an OPORD, setting a time and location for OPORD brief; and

- * Produce and brief the OPORD.

"**Reconnoiter**" and "**Begin necessary movement**" are steps that will be difficult to conduct in the normally very short amount of time available between receipt of mission and briefing the order in less developed units of ANA. Focus on WARNO and OPORD production, not to check the block, but to identify key tasks and prepare for proper execution by planning. If reconnaissance is an essential part of the mission, they will have been told explicitly by the battalion



Following the "demonstration" of what a correct order looks like, break up the order into little pieces and have the ANA officers replicate them under time constraints.



During the training, it is important that mentors do not lecture or attempt to hold an American-style discussion.

commander to focus on it as the essential task.

Warning Order

Keep it simple. Teach the ANA commanders to quickly identify a company mission statement from the battalion order. Teach them to quickly pull out essential hard times from the order. As a start, a company WARNO should not contain more than the mission statement, timeline, and time and location of OPORD brief.

As soon as the warning order is put out, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants are instructed to begin preparing their platoons for the mission. The commander should begin prepping the OPORD, while the ISG preps the platoons, and the executive officer (XO) coordinates with higher for updates.

Day 1 Morning, Hours 1-4: Paragraph 1 (Situation)

After quickly covering TLPs and WARNO 1, begin teaching the OPORD. Because many battalion commanders simply make copies of the corps or brigade order and hand them out to company commanders in lieu of a battalion WARNO or OPORD, company commanders get bogged down copying the multi-page situation paragraph while creating their own order. This results in a typical order having 80 percent of its length in **paragraph 1**, with **paragraphs 2-5** consisting of 20 percent of the order length. The key in teaching **paragraph 1** is to limit its length, by identifying and incorporating only the essentials.

Ideally, you should teach the ANA commanders to identify the portion of the **enemy paragraph** that applies to their AO, unit, and mission. If this is too challenging initially, you can have them focus on the following essentials:

1.A. Enemy

- 1.A.1.: Latest applicable enemy action in AO
- 1.A.2.: Enemy location
- 1.A.3.: Enemy size
- 1.A.4.: Enemy likely course of action

Each of these lines must be a single sentence. Brief a concise four-sentence **paragraph 1A** that still captures all essential facts about the enemy to the commanders, showing them what right looks like. Explain how their Soldiers really do not need to know all the details about the enemy in the brigade's area of operations (AO). Explain to them that **paragraph 3** must be lengthy and detailed, not **paragraph 1**.

Once demonstration is complete, hand out your practice battalion order to the five commanders. Give them exactly three minutes to produce a **paragraph 1.A. Enemy**. At the end of three minutes, have them drop their pens and pay attention, as each commander stands up to brief his portion in under two minutes. Following the first presentation, all of your commanders will be more engaged in the course, realizing that their reputations among fellow commanders are at stake. Repeat this until all five commanders are able to produce a four-sentence **paragraph 1A** that still captures the essence of **paragraph 1A** from the battalion order. As they brief each other, you will be helping them bond with one another. Make it known from the beginning that they are allowed to give and receive help from one another. Turn it into a productive team-building exercise as well as a learning session.

For the friendly situation paragraph, begin by focusing only one level up. Most underdeveloped units have a hard time creating orders that show missions two levels up. Receiving orders showing three levels of mission causes subordinate leaders to confuse their mission with that of one or two levels higher. Emphasize to the company commanders that they are NOT brigade or battalion commanders. This may take multiple drills to help them learn. Make this paragraph simple, with one sentence per line. After several successful OPORD productions, you can have the commanders brief two levels up, but starting at only one level up is recommended for an underdeveloped unit.

1.B. Friendly

- 1.B.1.: (one level higher) Battalion mission statement.

1.B.2.: (adjacent unit missions) Brief task and purpose of each adjacent company within the battalion.

Again, similar to how **paragraph 1.A** was drilled, show them what right looks like by demonstrating a **paragraph 1.B**. Following the demonstration, hand out the practice battalion order again, and time them, three minutes to produce, and two minutes to brief. Repeat as necessary. This is the most technically difficult portion of paragraph one for many Afghans to grasp. The difficulty is compounded by a lack of technical development in the Dari military language. The words for “mission,” “task,” and “duty” are the same word in Dari: *Wazifay*. As such, explaining the difference between a mission and the many supporting tasks will be difficult. That is why your most patient leaders will have to teach MDMP and TLPs.

Once **enemy** and **friendly situation** portions are complete, teach them to abbreviate the environment as well. Most Afghan Soldiers have never left their country in their entire life, and understand their native terrain and weather very well. There is no need to waste precious planning and briefing time; spend about 15 minutes on the weather and terrain. Focus on the following only:

1.C. Environment

1.C.1. Terrain: List aspects of terrain that significantly affect enemy or friendly actions.

1.C.2. Weather: List aspects of weather that significantly affect enemy or friendly actions.

Repeat the same procedure for this part as the enemy and friendly: showing them what right looks like by personally conducting a three minute brief, followed by timed drills and briefing other students. This completes **paragraph 1**. All of this should take one morning (four hours). By this time, your company commanders should be getting introduced to briefing, as well as learning to abbreviate paragraph 1 into concise and useful information for their company. Take a lunch break and continue in the afternoon.

Day 1 Afternoon, hours 5 and 6: Paragraph 2 (Mission)

Teaching the mission statement consists of two parts: deriving your company restated mission from analysis of battalion order, and composing a **mission statement** that

Explain to them that in a combat environment, they will have a very limited planning timeline, but they will still have to produce proper orders, even if drastically abbreviated.

contains all five Ws (who, what, when, where, and why). The composition of a proper **mission statement** containing all five Ws is simple enough for your students to understand. You just need to drill them enough to turn it into “muscle memory.” Teach them to state it twice, per their “Commando Handbook,” which makes it easier for their subordinates to identify the **mission statement** and write it down. (The ANA Commando Handbook is nothing more than a verbatim translation of the U.S. Army Ranger Handbook. This, along with the rest of their doctrine, makes it easy for a properly trained U.S. mentor to train his Afghan student.) The derivation of the company **restated mission** from the battalion OPORD is more difficult. This is where your collection of older battalion OPORDs will pay dividends.

Begin not by going through another class of pulling out specified, implied, and essential tasks, but by going through an actual battalion order together and identifying the mission essential tasks for the student’s company. Show them to look for the 5Ws of a mission statement, which may be in separate parts of the battalion order. Once you have demonstrated it two or three times, each time with a new order, give the students a fresh set of orders and have them identify their mission statements. Drill them multiple times, giving them a more constrained timeline each time to build their skill and confidence. You can help them by teaching them to focus on **paragraph 3** of the battalion OPORD to find the company essential task. Explain to them that in a combat environment, they will have a very limited planning timeline, but they will still have to produce proper orders, even if drastically abbreviated. Following multiple iterations of identifying and briefing **paragraph 2**, the students should be confident enough to put together good company mission statements containing the 5Ws, properly derived from a battalion OPORD.

Day 1 Afternoon, hours 7 and 8: Synthesis of paragraphs 1 and 2

Take a short five minute break. Taking them out to run around the building in a formation worked for me, because by cutting them loose, you risk losing some of them for the rest of the day. Following the short recess, hand out some of the orders you already used for **paragraph 1** drills, but this time have them build paragraphs one and two. Work down to five minutes if feasible from receiving the order to production of **paragraphs 1** and **2**. The ANA officers should reach an acceptable level of comfortable proficiency by the end of hour four of the afternoon, on or around 1700. Release them for the evening. Total hours spent so far: eight hours.

Day 2, Eight hours: Paragraph 3, the center of gravity of the OPORD

Most ANA orders are too long in **paragraph 1** and too short in **paragraph 3**. This is likely because they were never shown a good example of a **paragraph 3**. Begin your morning by briefing a “perfect” company-level **paragraph 3**, detailing what each of the platoon will accomplish, clearly stating task, purpose, endstate, and scheme of maneuver, tied to a timeline. Demonstrate, not lecture, the different types of tasks that go in “**tasks to maneuver units**” versus “**coordinating instructions**.” Demonstrate the level of detail you expect while briefing actions on the objective. Forget about commander’s intent and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), but focus on **concept of operation/scheme of maneuver, actions on the objective, and timeline**. You can teach commander’s intent and CCIR later on after your commanders are able to brief perfect concepts of operation and actions on the objective. Don’t worry about fires and close air support (CAS) as organic artillery and CAS are extremely few and far in between.

Incorporate one map and one objective sketch. Use the map to show the big picture and the objective sketch to brief actions on the objective. I do not recommend using a sand table at this stage, as it is time and resource consuming to build and does not produce that much more effect than a well drawn objective sketch does. Show them what right looks like by personally briefing a solid 15-minute **paragraph 3**. They will

learn so much more by your briefing of a perfect **paragraph 3**, than hearing you lecture the components of a **paragraph 3** for the umpteenth time. Have them take notes, role-playing PLTs during your company OPORD brief.

Once the demonstration is complete, begin by having the company commanders build a company timeline. Initially this will contain nothing but specified times from the battalion order. Once this is complete, have them build the company concept of operation. For the initial iteration of the concept of operation, give them 15 minutes. As you have just demonstrated what it looks like, it will suffice. Help them and allow them to help each other during this process. Since they are building five identical concepts from the same order, allowing mutual assistance will help it become a synergistic process. Have them build phases of the operation that correspond to the battalion phases. Make sure they understand to designate one of the platoons as main effort, and assign tasks and purposes for all subordinate elements. Make sure they designate tasks for each phase, per subordinate unit, tied to the existing timeline. As they flesh out tasks per phase, they will develop their own company internal hit times for all sub tasks, fleshing out the company timeline.

Use a simple order for the initial 15-minute iteration. Their work will naturally expand to use up all allotted time, which is why it is essential to limit them to 15 minutes for the initial iteration. More learning occurs by briefing and watching others brief. This is where you should focus. As each of the commanders begins understanding what constitutes a correct **paragraph 3**, they will begin chiming in with helpful comments during other commanders' briefings. Allow this to continue and flourish. They will be able to help each other more than you can. You should have reached lunchtime by the end of the five briefs.

After lunch, give them a slightly more built-up scenario, with a 20-minute time constraint. By the end of the second iteration of briefings, you will have identified who is having a difficult time and exactly where the difficulties lie. Take 10 minutes to go over these identified areas of difficulty and another demonstration of what right looks like for that section only. Repeat this focused retraining until reaching a point of diminished return from the students on or around 1700. By the end of day two, most commanders will have attained a high level of understanding of the operations order paragraph 3. If your unit has time available, spending an extra day on **paragraph 3** will pay huge dividends for the entire battalion. But if not, continue with **paragraphs 4 and 5** on day three. Total hours spent so far: 16.

Minimum components of a basic ANA OPORD
Paragraph 3:

Concept of Operation

- Type of Operation: One sentence (ex: Ambush, Raid, or Cordon and Search)
- Decisive Effort Task and Purpose: One sentence
- Shaping Efforts Tasks and Purposes: One sentence per PLT or element
- End State

Scheme of Maneuver

Describe individual PLT location and task per phase:

Best built and briefed using an execution matrix, tied to the timeline (**Execution Matrix** may have to wait until the ANA commanders are ready for the next phase of training.)

Tasks to Maneuver Units: All tasks the PLTs must accomplish to allow the company to successfully accomplish the mission, limit to no more than three per PLT.


Coordinating Instructions: Leave the combat service and support (CSS)-type tasks for **paragraph 4 and 5**. Focus on combat tasks that require multiple units to work together, such as linking up sectors of fire at PLT boundaries, or cordon emplacements. Limit to no more than two per PLT.

Actions on the OBJ: Have a Ranger-qualified instructor demonstrate briefing a detailed **actions on the objective** using the objective sketch, from the beginning of the mission to the end. This portion of the brief alone should last at least 10 minutes, detailing all major tasks and subtasks down to PLT level.

Day 3 Morning: Paragraphs 4 and 5 and use of NCOs

For day three, have the commanders bring their ISGs and Commo SGTs if available. Do not get hung up on the entirety of the doctrinal format, but focus on what platoons need to know. Most commanders and ISGs I have observed end up briefing their duties and responsibilities as they apply to service support and communication during **paragraphs 4 and 5**. Again, as mentioned above, the word for task, mission, and duty are the same in Dari. Explain to the students that the OPORD brief is not the time and place to brief their duties and responsibilities. Explain to them that everything they brief in **paragraph 4** must be a plan, meaning, connected to a time and a location. For example, a typical ANA paragraph 4 will state, "the 1SG will coordinate for ammunition for the entire company." Show them how it must state, "all platoon SGTs will report to ____ (location) NLT ____ (time) to draw ____ rds. of AK 47, and ____ rds. of PKM ammunition and distribute them to the squad leaders NLT ____ (time)." This instruction should take no more than 10 minutes, including translation.

Do the same for **paragraph 5**. Tell them not to brief, "the Commo SGT will distribute the frequencies," but to brief, "the battalion frequency is ____, and the company internal frequency is ____."



Sustainment training should be drill/critique heavy with little or no teaching involved.

Now give them an example brief of a short (five minutes or less), concise order that contains all the essential elements of **paragraphs 4 and 5** to allow the platoon to operate. Following the demonstration brief, hand out short practice battalion orders, and give the CDRs, 1SGs, and Commo SGTs 30 minutes to prepare their brief. CDRs will assist their 1SGs, and Commo SGTs, but have the 1SGs brief **paragraph 4** and Commo SGTs brief **paragraph 5**. Including these senior NCOs in the planning process will only help the ANA senior NCOs gain further credibility in the eyes of the Soldiers, while simultaneously allowing the CDRs to focus on operational planning and coordination. You will find that many 1SGs are better trained to brief, as they typically will be recent graduates of Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC) NCO courses. The main challenge will be to prevent them from briefing their duties and responsibilities and sticking to briefing the plan.

Most of the time, CDRs and 1SGs will have a full understanding of basic **paragraphs 4 and 5** in one morning. During the afternoon, you can move on to a culmination exercise that synthesizes everything the team has learned in the past three days.

Minimum components of a basic ANA OPORD **Paragraphs 4 and 5**:

4. Service Support

Material: Time, location, and amount of supply distribution from 1SG to PSGs for: ammunition, fuel, food, water

Health: Location of casualty collection point per phase of mission, location of 1SG and battalion aid station

Personnel: Iterate any daily personnel reporting requirement, to include casualty reporting, from PSG to 1SG

5. Command and Signal

Command:

Location of battalion command post during mission

Location of company CDR during mission

Location of XO and 1SG during mission

Succession of command from company CDR down to the last PLT leader

Signal:

Battalion primary frequency

Battalion alternate frequency

Company frequency

Time and location of company and battalion communication rehearsal

Day 3, Afternoon and Day 4: Culmination Exercise

In the afternoon of day three, begin the culmination exercise. Hand out your most complete example battalion order and give the students three hours to prepare their complete OPORD, to include all sketches, charts, and other briefing aids. Assist them and allow them to assist each other in the preparation. At the end of three hours, have them turn in their final products to you. They will be released for the rest of the night and return the next morning to brief using their completed products. They will not be allowed to bring anything to the brief that they did not turn in. This is how our CPTs are tested in the career course, and you can tell the Afghans that they have been trained and will be tested to basic U.S. standard. Most ANA officers and senior NCOs will appreciate this level of challenge.

The next morning, have camcorders or at least cameras ready for the presentation. Recorded sessions will allow the ANA to watch

their own performance, and self-grade using the OPORD format in the future for their own edification. For each brief, require everyone else to watch and pitch in with comments at the end. I found most ANA officers desiring a comparative grade at the end of this session. You can develop an objective grading matrix and tell them where they stand. You will see them rising up to the challenge, with 1SG and Commo SGTs pulling their weight, with impressive results. Hours spent total: 24-30 hours. Now you have built a solid foundation of validated knowledge for continued coaching, training, and mentoring.

Schedule Sustainment/Follow-up Training

Executing TLPs and producing OPORDs is a highly perishable skill, requiring constant usage. If your unit goes through significant periods without receiving OPORDs from higher, as their mentor you will need to conduct sustainment training for your ANA officers and NCOs. By collecting good examples of ANA battalion OPORDs, you can develop a file of training orders to use for sustainment training. Depending on time available, you can retrain your ANA leaders in producing specific portions of the OPORD or the entire OPORD. Make sure you bring the subject up during ANA battalion training meeting to schedule it ahead of time.

If the situation allows, develop a plan for follow-up training. You can teach one extra section per session, not to exceed one or two hours. Of course, these new additions to the OPORDs should be taught using the hands-on methodology described earlier in the article. Some topics for follow-on training are:

- Enemy's most *DANGEROUS* course of action
- Higher's task and purpose *TWO* levels up
- Linking tasks and purposes up and down the echelon
- Commander's intent
- Building and using *two separate SAND TABLES* for concept of operations and actions on the objective
- CCIR and essential elements of friendly information (EEFI)
- Platoon leaders' backbrief
- Squad, platoon, and company rehearsal
- Company rock drill

Conclusion

Teaching the TLP and OPORD process is a vital task for mentors. Many ANA units are blessed with well-trained officers and NCOs well versed in TLPs. In the absence of properly trained leaders, the best method for addressing this critical gap is for the mentors to teach TLP/OPORD to the ANA leadership. This article presents one method of accomplishing that task. It is a tested and proven method that you can adjust to your local situation. Mentoring is not easy, and advances are made in tiny increments. But teaching TLP /OPORD will give you an immediate result that trickles down the chain of command all the way down to each individual rifleman. Best of luck on your mentoring journey!

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Not JUST COLLATERAL DAMAGE

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES HAVE CRITICAL EFFECT ON LOEs

1LT WESLEY R. SPARKS

The four lines of effort in a counterinsurgency, as defined by FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, are not static, balanced, or unrelated. They are intertwined and codependent. The lines of effort cannot be charted on a bar graph with specific numbers, colors, or grades. By trying to quantify them we make the mistake of applying our social values and norms to a culture that has completely different viewpoints on the facets of life we have given titles to: security, governance, development, and information. The effects of each category and our effects on the lines of effort are not confined to what we intend. We try on a daily basis to move “the ball forward” or “make progress” on improving Paktika Province in southeastern Afghanistan. Rarely, though, will we admit that we have moved in a negative direction. As much as we try to be a stabilizing force, our presence alone can be the opposite.

Many of our international partners have a benign presence here with limited interaction with the local populace; therefore, there is minimal risk to themselves and civilians. Our battalion has wholeheartedly embraced a level of partnership and interaction that was previously unheard of. There are certainly high hopes for this “new way forward.” The reward can be a multi-functional Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA),

which is fully assuming responsibility for its own populace. As coveted as the reward can be, it exposes us to the most tremendously damaging aspect of our efforts. Negligence, indifference, and complacency create civilian casualties. Injuries and accidental deaths of civilians affect the four lines of effort more than any of our altruistic attempts to improve life in western Paktika.

The number of instances and even the details of an incident are inconsequential. Also, the truth about the accidental death or injury has little or nothing to do with the perception. Our enemies here try to maintain their superficial moral authority using religion and perverted versions of the nation’s history. The enemy leaders use culturally ingrained religious dogma and superstitious tendencies among the civilians to accentuate any failure on the coalition’s part. There is no connection between the truth and what will spread through the populace like wildfire. Our enemies will not use detailed, all encompassing descriptions. They will exaggerate and paint the picture they want to be believed. Their methods of controlling the dialogue are more effective than any overt military action or act of intimidation on their part.

Civilian casualties — whether inflicted despite good intentions or with obvious negligence — affect all lines of effort, not

necessarily in equal measures. Our tools to mitigate these instances are certainly not adequate and that is simply the nature of what the conflict has become. One incident will never be portrayed by our enemies as one incident. The secondary and tertiary effects of a coalition failure with regards to the civilian populace grow exponentially. This can be summarized in one phrase: “when it rains, it pours.”

Security is generally considered the first line of effort. Any civilian in the world — American, Afghan, or otherwise — would see it as the Infantry’s “bread and butter.” Most civilians in the United States and the civilians here in western Paktika think every Soldier is an Infantryman. Armed men in uniform must be Infantry Soldiers, patrolling and fighting to improve security. As ill-informed as this impression is, it helps the overall propaganda efforts of our enemies. People in the United States think of security in Afghanistan as an abstract term thrown around by pundits on television. The people of Afghanistan have a much more concrete definition of security. They have long memories of military cruelty from invading armies. There is a fine line between an armed occupying force securing the country and a belligerent, unwelcome army akin to the brutal occupation by the Russians. A hundred Taliban fighters defeated in a pitched battle

has nowhere near the tangible effect on security as one incident of an unarmed civilian casualty. There is no scoreboard in the minds of the Afghans that we can point to and say “our missteps are outweighed by our successes.” On a daily basis we expect the Afghans to trust our intentions. This trust is earned slowly by mutual respect, and we have much to overcome to earn this trust. Being foreigners, barely familiar with the customs and culture of Afghanistan, it is a daily struggle to convince the populace that we are trying to improve security. We are trying to secure their country using their definition, not ours. But effort does not necessarily equal success. Hundreds of patrols can go completely unnoticed by the civilians here, but the one patrol where we fail to live up to the trust and promises will be remembered for years. The death or injury of a child will never be forgotten by the parents. Rightfully so, but taking one step forward and two steps back will never equal out to a result we want.

We are asking the Afghans to deal with our military presence as simply a fact of life and often times we take their cooperation and tolerance for granted. To an 8-year-old child our presence is a fact of life. There have been Americans in huge trucks with guns pointed at their villages their entire lives. It is up to us to set the tone of that narrative, though. A simple wave and smile from a turret will never balance out the pain and suffering caused by a stray round. We use the term collateral damage to insulate ourselves from the negative effects we can cause. But to a civilian here praying every day for security, there is no such thing as collateral damage. It is simply irreparable damage. We are constantly forced to make split-second decisions for our own security and that of the population. That moment is not the correct time to decide what is right and what is wrong. We must constantly strive to plan ahead to when we will face these decisions. As leaders we must instill sound judgment in our Soldiers so that they can be as prepared as we can make them. The cause and effect of our actions can barely be predicted, but we can never pretend that an incident only goes as far as a bullet. One could certainly argue that the repercussions can be extreme and often unrelated to the motivations of the actions we take, but it is very naïve to try to make excuses using our definition of fair and just. Our enemies here do not use our terminology and they certainly do not hold themselves to our standards of civil-military relations.

Our Soldiers need to be aware that our version of security and the public’s perception are not the same. Even when we weigh the benefits with the costs, we may still come out losing. We are not the only influence on the populace’s opinions. The most we can hope for is some involvement in the conversation so that we can contradict the historical context here and the enemies’ perverted sense of psychological warfare.

Governance is a broad term that in many ways combines all of the lines of effort into one seemingly immeasurable category. Improving governance is such a relative idea. In some villages in Paktika when a chief of police doesn’t steal from the populace that is success. In others a completely Afghan-administered program putting money into the hands of civilians can be an utter failure. The opinions of the elders in a shura are often one of our few gauges to the effectiveness of GIRoA. While empowering government officials to take responsibility for their own districts,

A simple wave and smile from a turret will never balance out the pain and suffering caused by a stray round. We use the term collateral damage to insulate ourselves from the negative effects we can cause. But to a civilian here praying every day for security, there is no such thing as collateral damage.

we also expose them to a major source of discontent. In some ways it is a sign of strengthening governance when the people bring their problems before a district sub-governor or to a provincial governor, but when the problem is the death of a civilian in their area they are being handed an unsolvable problem. So often their influence on the population is so precarious that justified outrage on the part of the locals leaves the government official with little recourse and even less ability to quell the intolerance for our presence. We leave our government partners with no possible words to offer if a lifeless child is brought to the doorstep of a district center. The death of a child will always defeat our feeble description of a situation. Even explaining ourselves adds insult to injury. In the United States, we are accustomed to a certain level of authority provided to our elected leaders. That is not a luxury we have here. Putting an “Afghan face” on a humanitarian government outreach can be completely negated by a horrible situation we might put our Afghan partners in. Hours, days, and years trying to take ourselves out of the equation and enable the GIRoA for success can be washed away by one bullet. A bullet fired in error or even in an honest attempt to separate the enemy from the populace is a bright, glaring reminder of our presence. Our efforts to minimize our damage to the populace is not seen by the Afghans. The markings on a vehicle that runs a civilian vehicle off the road mean nothing, it is simply another American behemoth bearing down on innocent people. We cannot hide behind the defense of “it was a different unit” or even “the perpetrators have been punished.” Each vehicle and each platoon interacting with the populace is not an island unto itself. We are the sum of all American actions here in Afghanistan. While it may seem unfair to us to be grouped with someone we have no control over, that is just another example of us trying to apply our own definition of justice. Incidents accumulate, and too often our Afghan government officials are left catching the blame for our failures.

We are ill-equipped to measure the positive and negative effects of our actions. The number of positive interactions is completely inconsequential to a single epic failure. Our Afghan governmental partners are truly the key to shifting the paradigm in West Paktika, but no matter how much fresh water or clinic improvements we facilitate, governance is what the population believes it is. Afghanistan is a nation with no history of centralized government, so when we fail to faithfully uphold the trust of the locals by injuring one of their own we are taking moral capital out of a fund that does not exist. We don’t have a tradition of public faith in Afghan leaders we can rely on. A child killed puts us into a hole that in some ways we can never escape from. There will always be a family that can not close that chapter of their lives no matter how many reliefs in place/transfers of authority (RIP/TOAs) occur and no matter how many different unit patches come through their

village. While we and our Afghan partners sometimes benefit from the fruits of a previous unit's successes, any positive results are tempered severely by the damage we can inflict on an innocent family. The strategy of the international governing bodies and our own military strategy can shift dramatically with every little change in public discourse. But there is certainly one constant: we count on and hope that civic development will separate the zealots from the civilian population. To develop Afghanistan we have chosen the route of empowering Afghan tribal leaders and elected national figures to steer the development process. We hope that by giving them the credit for road and public works projects that we are improving their legitimacy. This visibility serves as a lightning rod for positive and negative blowback.

All of three previously mentioned lines of effort are controlled by the final — the daily battle to control the narrative of our efforts here. The idea of controlling the flow of information and coloring the story line is not new to warfare. But it seems like we start back at the ground floor every time a new unit comes into theater. It has been said history is written by the winners. Here in Paktika and throughout Afghanistan, history is written daily about the losers. We do not have the luxury of putting our noses to the grindstone, winning battle after hard fought battle, and then sitting back after the fact and naming campaign streamers. In the age of media saturation we have entered, for better or worse, we must get better at dealing with the repercussions. While we are rushing to play catch up in the control of information in this country, each incident places us at the center of a dangerous storm with millions watching.

The primary difference with the struggle to dominate the

information flow in this war and with previous wars is that vigilant masses are no longer passive in the ongoing conversation. In wars past a few major news conglomerates controlled the headlines. A spokesman from the war department could make a declaration like "It's Over" and ticker tape parades would be thrown in cities around the world. Now, with all forms of 24-hour news media, international communications, and ubiquitous broad band internet access, any person in the world can steal the headlines. Today, people all around the world can immerse themselves in constant media coverage of the war in this far off place most Americans cannot even identify on a map. We try to take advantage of this, granting journalists and photographers unprecedented coverage by embedding with units on the ground. Despite our best efforts, it seems the enemy still has the upper hand. One video of dead civilians does immeasurable damage to our other lines of effort. Over the past year the details of several incidents have been dissected very publicly. This second-guessing from the fourth estate makes most in the military uncomfortable. As an institution we are reluctant to fully accept criticism from third parties. But really in a war of ideas, perception is where the true victory lies.

Our enemies know that winning the media perception war is the key. Time and again it has been proven they cannot stand and fight to win. While their culture is ancient, they are not foolish in the field we call information operations. The nature of an armed force in an unfriendly nation will always result in less than glorious moments. If they can capture enough of these moments in the public eye, it can perpetuate their false claims. Again, the truth of the situation has little to no bearing on people's

perceptions. On the micro level they try to control the topics in a shura by reminding the elders of our failings. Their efforts go from the village level all the way up to the strategic level.

The key to remember down at the platoon level is if you fire a bullet, it can't be taken back. That moment where a Soldier must make the life and death decision is such a fluid time. After a firefight, most Soldiers don't even know how many rounds they fired. But in my experience it is the shot taken without the fog of war, just plain negligence or indifference that causes us the most damage. As difficult as it may be for our Soldiers, many times it is the round not fired that inches our endeavor closer to victory. It is the responsibility of us leaders to ensure Soldiers know the difference.



SGT Christopher T. Sneed

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment walk with a community member to the site of a key leader engagement in Tur Kheyl, Afghanistan, on 17 April 2009.

1LT Wesley R. Sparks was commissioned from Army ROTC at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. After graduating from the Infantry Basic Officer Leadership Course and Ranger School, he served as the S4 for 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment at Fort Richardson, Alaska. 1LT Sparks is currently serving as a platoon leader working with Afghan National Security Forces in Paktika Province.

AN ASSAULT CP IN A STRYKER BCT

Reorganizing the AT Company into a Fighting Formation Relevant to Today's OE

MAJ SAM LINN

The 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division decided early on in its generation to re-organize its anti-tank company to meet the current need for an assault command post (ACP), a fighting command and control (C2) platform for the brigade commander and key staff, that can independently maneuver on the battlefield.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom rotations in 2005-2007, Stryker BCTs were primarily employed as an "above ground force," or a force not owning permanent battlespace, but rather using the advantage of mobility and digitization to maintain a flexible, mobile, regional quick reaction force (QRF)-type capability. This meant that battalions had to be able to move at a moment's notice, which they are manned and equipped to do. The brigade-level C2, however, was not capable of keeping up with the mobility of Stryker formations. The tactical command post (TAC) is realistically a 24-48 hour tear down and setup, too slow to provide adequate C2 to a rapidly maneuvering BDE (-) element that can maneuver 300-plus miles in a day and conduct combat operations that night. Starting with reallocating personnel and equipment across the brigade, continuing with specialized training and equipment procurement for personal security, 5/2's ACP passed its first test during the brigade's mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, Calif. Now, after three months of intense combat operations in southern Afghanistan, the AT company has validated the brigade's decision to recapitalize the anti-tank company into a fighting formation that is relevant and necessary in today's operational environment.

5/2 ID (SBCT)'s Recapitalization of Strykers to Establish Two ACPs and a PSD.

The modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), or starting point, for the SBCT AT company is 54 Soldiers and 11 Strykers, nine of which are Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Stryker variants. These vehicles are further broken down into three platoons of three ATGMs. The ATGM vehicle is not especially well suited to the ACP mission, since it is restricted from using its TOW missiles in certain environments and fits four crew members. Since the Mobile Gun System (MGS) vehicles were not fully fielded to our brigade (each MGS platoon has one MGS vehicle and two Infantry Combat Variants [ICVs], in lieu of), the brigade commander decided to laterally transfer one ATGM from the anti-tank company to each of the brigade's nine MGS platoons, and laterally transfer six ICVs from the MGS platoons to the AT company as replacements. Additionally, we laterally transferred the three Command Variant (CV) Strykers from HHC BDE to the anti-tank company, along with the crews, to provide unity of command to the ACP concept.

As the commander of the anti-tank company, which was




Figure 1 — AT CO Modified Vehicle Layout

responsible for the assault command posts for the brigade and deputy commanders, my task organization looks like this:

Two similar platoons consisting of four Strykers and a two-Stryker Headquarters section. (ACP 1 has two CVs and two ICVs with the CVs belonging to the brigade commander and brigade S3. ACP 2 has one CV, one Fire Support Variant (FSV), and two ICVs with the CV belonging to the deputy brigade commander.) Each platoon has 20 personnel: platoon leader, platoon sergeant, two-man forward observer (FO) team, a medic, 4 three-man crews, and a five-man personal security detachment (PSD) for the commander.

Assault Command Post and Personal Security Detachment Operations at NTC

By dedicating a company to command and control the ACPs, the brigade staff was freed almost entirely of any requirement to plan and coordinate movement for the brigade commander or deputy brigade commander (DCO). Instead, they merely had to turn to the ACP commander and give him task, purpose, and intent. The company commander would then coordinate with adjacent units and gather enablers such as fires, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, etc., through the brigade special troops battalion (BSTB). The company intelligence support team (IST) — two E5s with training on the Tactical Ground Reporting Network (TiGRNet) and Palantir system — assisted the platoon leaders in route development, threat analysis, and time distance analysis.

The company was colocated with the brigade headquarters

at NTC, giving it access to sufficient connectivity to maintain situational awareness (SA) of what the entire brigade was doing and do predictive analysis of what the brigade commander's priorities and potential meetings and desired locations may be. Additionally, the ACPs remained linked in with the brigade S2 to stay abreast of the current and emerging threats within the entire brigade AO.

At the company level, the single most important pre-mission tool for us was the ramp-side brief. This formation required all personnel who were coming on the combat patrol to attend and included the manifest call, an intelligence update, our route and actions on the objective plan, fire support, medical, and recovery plans. It also ensured everyone was present for rehearsals of battle drills following the brief, since there are invariably non-organic personnel attached on a mission (Psychological Operations, Human Intelligence, VIPs, interpreters, etc.) who require orientation and basic battle drill refreshers.

My primary planning responsibility as company commander was adjacent unit coordination. Since the brigade commander required freedom of maneuver within his entire battlespace, having someone dedicated to this task was extremely beneficial from brigade down to company level. Prior to SP, I would get on the radio, or free text using FCB2, and communicate with the gaining unit's S3 to explain the brigade commander's intentions, our element's composition, our route, and coordinate for any necessary linkup, be it a runner at the front gate of a FOB, or a platoon leader at an offset location to bring the ACP into a key leader engagement.

Manifesting was an extremely important part of the ACP function. With all the non-organic personnel traveling in the ACP, the company first sergeant and IST provided an essential function in building accurate manifests, to include VIPs, enablers, interpreters, and any other personnel required for the mission. The migration to ICVs from ATGMs facilitated the addition of these personnel, but maintaining accurate rosters of key leaders and attachments is something akin to herding cats.

Fire support planning at the company level was an essential function as well. The company fire support NCO planned all fires with adjacent units (since we have no organic fires delivery systems assigned to the company or battalion), ensuring the transition points between mortars and FA, as well as between battalions where supporting units changed. Additionally, the FS NCO submitted DD Form 1972s (air mission requests) for close combat attack (CCA) or close air support (CAS) for any pre-planned operations (as opposed to spur of the moment operations, which required X-CAS or E-CAS). Again, while traveling from one battalion AO to another, the ACP was able to shift fire support nets to another battalion, check in with the hot guns, and ensure we had coverage.

You may think, as I did initially, that dedicating a combat formation to permanent escort and personal security duty may be overkill or misallocation of a valuable resource — that an anti-tank company would be a valuable asset in Afghanistan either attached to the main effort for major operations, conducting operations as a TST force or as a land owner of a small battlespace within the brigade footprint. Only prolonged combat will tell us if that is

truly the case. My experience at NTC, and during our first three months of combat, would argue that dedicating a company to ACP duty on a permanent basis is a force multiplier for the brigade because it allowed the brigade's leaders to connect with spheres of influence in the local populace, government, and security forces. In a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, key leaders like the brigade commander are a weapon system and their words are their ammunition. The ACP is the delivery system that gets them on target. During our out-of-sector mission (100-mile night movement off the NTC reservation to the Southern California Logistics Airport, battalion assault at daylight, return to base same day), the brigade commander was able to stay in constant communications with the brigade tactical operations center (TOC) via vehicle-mounted communications. He had his S3, S2, and FSO all in the patrol, so he could staff information and make informed decisions. He had no need to worry about the local fight, because he had a patrol leader (ILT) in charge of the patrol, and he did not have to worry about getting in the way of the battalion conducting the operation, because he had the AT company commander in the patrol to coordinate with the owning BN S3. The ACP was tied into the maneuver plan (our ACP attended the combined arms rehearsal and battalion rehearsal; our task was a blocking position) and we were able to slice a Stryker section to support a company in contact because we were reporting to the maneuvering BN S3, basically as a task-organized platoon (+) within their formation.

At the same time that the out-of-sector mission was being conducted, my other ACP moved the DCO to conduct a key leader engagement with the provincial governor to inform him of the operation and conduct consequence management. This out-of-sector mission proved the utility of having two ACPs. The second ACP was a dedicated maneuver force that prevented the need to task maneuver battalions to move the DCO. Those battalions were already challenged with combat power due to having to provide security within the AO of the battalion conducting the out-of-sector mission.

Ability to Operate as an Independent Maneuver Force

At the same time the brigade commander instructed me to form the company as two ACPs, he also told me to be prepared to fight as a company. This posed several challenges, most of which pertained to personnel available and the lack of a higher headquarters staffed to support an Infantry company's training progression. With this said, we were able to go through the normal gates for a company, starting with dismounted team and squad situational training exercises (STXs) and live fires, executing a complex platoon live fire, and culminating with a mounted company combined arms live-fire exercise (CALFEX).

With regards to personnel, the struggle is the ability to put boots on the ground. With 54 personnel by MTOE, and with 12 or more Soldiers detached throughout most of my training progression, manning the Strykers was difficult at times. Our reorganization into two platoons, vice three, helped in this regard. By decreasing the number of vehicles, we could increase the number of Soldiers available. Additionally, by recapitalizing the armorer as my M2 gunner, and the training room clerk as a vehicle driver, we were able to maximize available boots on the ground. Part of the trade-

off of a smaller company is the loss of security in numbers for a gain in control; I was able to ensure my low density MOS Soldiers received the same amount of time at the range, iterations in the shoothouse, and level of participation in collective training rather than keeping them in a support role for these exercises.

The MTOE is still largely based on a linear fight with an AT company conducting traditional roles of attack by fire, screen, or cover. However, when conducting full spectrum operations in the contemporary operating environment, this is rarely necessary or applicable. Generating the company with this guidance caused numerous property book and personnel issues; I have two of 11 of my pacing items by MTOE. Explaining this on unit status reports (USRs) has been difficult, but the concept is valid and clearly provides a capability that is not inherent within a standard SBCT. The manning for personal security is critically short by MTOE. The two-man element authorized to HHC BDE has no clear command structure and will usually result in a lack of sufficient specialized high risk personnel (trained by the Military Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.) training.

Training under the BSTB as a higher headquarters posed a unique challenge. With five unlike companies (HHC, Engineers, Signal, Military Intelligence, and AT), the staff is understandably not able to focus on any one company for any length of time. The best practice in my estimation was to keep abreast of all adjacent battalion's training calendars (both informally by looking at calendars posted on the shared drive and formally by attending

brigade planning sessions), and tie in whenever possible with training resourced by a line infantry battalion. I was able to execute two separate resource-intensive live-fire exercises this way, which I would have had difficulty executing without the owning battalion's support.

Combat Operations in Afghanistan – Regional Command South

The brigade deployed to southern Afghanistan in July 2009 and has since conducted four brigade (-) operations in which the assault command post has been utilized. The brigade's AO is approximately 300 kilometers by 400 kilometers (approximately the size of West Virginia) and encompasses two distinct provinces: Zabul and Kandahar. In an effort to adequately partner with the command structures to the Afghan government, the brigade permanently established the TAC, with the deputy commander, as the C2 element in Zabul. This drastically increased the need for the ACP in brigade

operations.

The ACPs have conducted more than 50 operations thus far. These include tactical roadmarches to security councils and shuras, company and platoon command visits, as well as four brigade (-) operations in which we provided a C2 maneuver element.

The first brigade operation was the initial push from our reception, staging and onward movement location at Kandahar Airfield out into the respective battalion AOs. The second was for the Afghan national elections in August, and the third and fourth were high intensity combat operations involving two Stryker Infantry battalions, Canadian mentor teams, Afghan National Police, and a battalion (-) of Afghan National Army. These operations were conducted in the Arghandab River Valley, one of the five "gateways" into Kandahar City, and the primary Taliban route from the foothills of the Hindu Kush into the population centers. The ACP conducted its initial movement behind



Photo courtesy of author

Soldiers with the 5/2 SBCT assault command post conduct command and control operations during a brigade mission in the Arghandab River valley of Afghanistan in October 2009.

the main effort battalion and was able to maneuver the brigade commander to a location where he could get a good sense of the battle. Additionally, he could provide instant feedback on actions requiring his approval, such as indirect fires, night searches, hasty clearance of compounds due to fleeting targets, and asset allocation. With a company commander responsible for the ACP, the coordination with the battlespace owner was seamless. The ACP was never “in the way,” but rather it could act as an additional maneuver platoon as necessary for tasks such as block or interdict.

The Stryker ACP carries a large amount of capability and connectivity. Inherent within the vehicles is FM, tactical satellite, Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below ([FBCB2] — Enhanced position location reporting system [EPLRS] as well as Blue Force Tracker [BFT]). Within the ACP, we also have the capability to provide a One Station Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) downlink for real-time SA of ISR feed, Land Warrior TOC-in-a-Box (17’ screen with imagery that overlays current location of all fire team leaders and above), immediate photo-printing capability (useful for leader engagements), as well as field desks, chairs, and camo nets for enduring operations. The company purchased highly ruggedized materials for this capacity, which has since proved essential to the durability of our CP setup. Everything is in a Pelican case, all critical systems have redundancy (BFT, OSRVT), and any high-failure components (spaghetti cables, headsets) have a stockage on hand.

The personnel within the ACP have the specific training to task organize for multiple missions, such as including a dismounted platoon with close protection personnel, a Stryker section with CP to attach to a platoon or company HQ, or a four-to-seven vehicle element capable of independent maneuver. The ability to flex between these task organizations means that the “antenna farm” is always able to fit the threat and friendly situation, as required.

Following the initial assault into the area, the ACP moved to a hard site within FM communication range of both maneuver battalions. The ACP commander, in conjunction with the ACP battle captain, made prior coordination for enhanced connectivity at this site, to provide secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNet) and secure voice over internet protocol (SVoIP) access through a command post node. This meant the brigade commander could talk to his battalion commanders via FM, watch their ISR feeds, hear their battalion nets, pass operational graphics and receive blue feed via the maneuver control system (MCS), and get intelligence updates via MiRC from all assets available.

As a Land Warrior-enabled brigade, being within the EPLRS bubble also greatly enhances the real time situational awareness of the brigade commander. Especially with the approval requirements currently in place under International Security Assistance Force rules of engagement (ROE), the brigade commander’s ability to rapidly assess and make decisions can mean the difference in an enemy being destroyed with fires or escaping, with the deciding factor being delay due to lag in communication. On several occasions, this access to information also assisted the brigade commander in making the decision not to engage when the risk of creating civilian casualties was high. From within the EPLRS bubble, the brigade commander can see the location and orientation of every fire team in the brigade. When positioned in a location

that allows both FM communications with battalion commanders and access to ISR feed, the brigade commander’s decision-making ability is greatly enhanced and much more precise than it would be from the brigade TOC.

Steady State Operations

The primary advantage of the ACP is its maneuverability. Within our brigade AO, there is now no location that a company can maneuver that the ACP cannot; meaning the brigade commander can conduct battlefield circulation without significant restriction. With a company headquarters responsible for coordination, battalions have excellent situational awareness on the movement of the ACP and are never tasked to provide a platoon for security. The ACP takes care of its own needs and will often coordinate with the land-owning company commander for any specific shortages he has on the ground. For example, when visiting an austere platoon patrol base, the ACP brought and left cots and class 1 for the Soldiers. Additionally, we coordinate to tie into the patrol and security plan of whatever COP/patrol base we remain overnight. This both relieves pressure on the owning unit, and keeps our skills from eroding, since the frequency of our dismounted maneuver is minimal. Patrolling frequently with squad and platoon level elements across the brigade also causes what I call “cross-pollination of best practices” across the brigade. Each of the maneuver battalions is making great strides in TTPs, and with our frequent circulation, we can help get these good ideas directly into the hands of squad and platoon leadership in other AOs. Although these are small contributions by all accounts, they both reinforce the purpose and enhance the residual feeling of a command visit.

Conclusion

Six months of combat in the extremely lethal environment of southern Afghanistan has validated 5/2 ID (SBCT)’s decision to reorganize the anti-tank company into two assault command posts and a personal security detachment. This reorganization worked because the AT company assumed all planning responsibility for the movement and security of the brigade commander and deputy commander. The SBCT commander and deputy commander can move freely across the battlefield, conduct simultaneous, synchronized, coordinated operations, and maintain full command and control of the brigade from remote locations throughout major combat operations. The command and control structure required to coordinate, battle track, and support simultaneous ACP missions throughout a very large operating area is comparable to how a normal company-level CP is equipped. With the theater standard for combat patrols, having two four-vehicle platoons dedicated to the mission makes perfect sense for a mobility-minded brigade command team.

MAJ Sam Linn has commanded A Company, 52nd Infantry Regiment since October 2007. He previously served as the brigade assistant S3 for Force Modernization in the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division. As a lieutenant, he deployed with the 101st Airborne to Iraq in OIF 1 and then to Afghanistan. He also deployed twice to Iraq with the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, where he served as a company fire support officer and executive officer. He is a 2002 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and was commissioned into the Field Artillery.

ON THE EDGE

U.S. Special Forces Soldiers are extracted from a mountain pinnacle in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, by a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 82nd Aviation Regiment, after executing an air assault mission to disrupt insurgent communication.

Photo by SSG Aubree Clute





COIN IN PRACTICE:

BOTTOM-UP TACTICS TO DEVELOP THE DISTRICTS OF AFGHANISTAN

SGT DEBRA RICHARDSON

At first glance the San Gar Mountain range in Zabul Province's Shin Kay district may not appear to be the ideal location to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. With peaks more than 7,000 feet tall and ridgelines extending the entire length of the district, the mountain range successfully separates the district center from most of the district's population. The lack of coalition and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) near the only improved mountain pass has allowed insurgents freedom of movement through the district.

By military doctrine, the theory of counterinsurgency focuses on three areas: security, governance, and development. The U.S. Special Forces team located in the Shin Kay district acts as mentors to the area's Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army's 1st Kandak and the district chief. As mentors, it is the team's job to advise and assist the ANSF with planning and execution of missions to provide local security, district governance, and support to economic development.

"Although the COIN initiative has plenty of published literature, there are very few practical applications that the guy on the ground can take and implement," explains the Shin Kay USSF team leader. "But my team has found that by mentoring the ANA and ANP and bringing those two together creates a team that the people fully support."

The Operational Detachment – Alpha (ODA) was asked by Afghan forces to assist on a patrol through the San Gar Mountains. The ANA had received reporting that suggested a local insurgent group was staging on the other side of the mountain range and had already emplaced several roadside bombs. The ODA had several meetings with the ANA and Shin Kay district ANP to listen to plans for a chosen route and a contingency plan. Dab Pass, which runs through the San Gar Mountains, is a frequently-used route by locals for commerce. It also connects to the provincial center city of Qalat. Afghan civilians, ANSF and CF also use the pass to travel from the District Center to the Shin Kay sub-district Surri.

After contacting the ANA, ANP and coalition forces located at the forward operating base (FOB) in Surri, the ODA advised a change in the mission. The ODA looked to expand "white space" in the area. White space is a military term, which refers to the amount of space around a unit or firebase in which the population supports the Afghan government or coalition forces.

Recently Lithuanian Special Forces (Lith SOF) began establishing itself at the Surri FOB to act as mentors to the new Zabul Provincial Response Company of the ANP, a special tactics unit. Even with multiple deployments, Lith SOF missions that put the focus of operations on protecting the population are a new concept. A small detachment of British SAS and U.S. Navy SEALs was assigned to act as logistical supporters, intelligence analysts and COIN mentors for Lith SOF.

Since the ODA and ANSF were already developing missions

to help unify Shin Kay district and coalition forces at Surri sub-district were looking for an example of current COIN in practice, a combined mission in Surri became the perfect solution for all of the forces in the area.

"This was the perfect set up," explained the USSF team leader. "We accompanied our partnered force and ended up working through, with and by them to shape the COIN fight with the ANSF in Surri and their Coalition partnered forces."

The team leader added that the ANP work best in smaller urban areas. The ANA work best on larger missions because there are more personnel in the force. Together the two forces can complement each other. Combining the forces projects civil and military influence while legitimizing the Afghan government and bringing it to the people, the USSF team leader explained.

Upon arrival at Surri, the ODA gathered representatives from the units involved: Lith SOF, U.S. Navy SEALs, British SAS, the ANP, the ANA's 4th Kandak. The 5th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 101st Airborne Division and Company A, 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division were also represented since they would be partnered with each local ANSF element in areas of responsibility around Surri.

In a meeting room with barely enough seating, the USSF team leader explained COIN and how it would be applied throughout Shin Kay district.

"There is a theory that if this government is going to work, it is going to work at the lowest level, and that lowest level is the district level," the ODA team leader explained during the initial briefing. "It is my goal to work with everyone in this room in order to make our two areas work together, as a district, for the benefit of the people."

After the first meeting, the district ANA and ANP were asked to work with their sub-district ANA and ANP counterparts to develop their portion of the first operation — a patrol to a small village nearly two kilometers from the firebase but still within the white space.

The next morning each force briefed their portion of the combined mission brief. The district ANA commander explained the ANA's role during the convoy and the various positions surrounding the village where his men would conduct security during the operation.

After a three-hour convoy, the ANP secured the village and was granted permission to conduct the Shura in one of the compounds.

The meeting began with introductions. Once the district chief, Abdul Qadeem, was introduced, the elders began a lengthy conversation, talking only to Qadeem and the ANSF present for over an hour.

"District Chief Qadeem, I recognize you from two years ago; it is great to see you in front of the convoy, to see you in front of all these people," the village Mullah said as he motioned at the Westerners sitting cross legged against the wall. The inference there was how

great it was to see Qadeem in charge, seeing an Afghan taking care of his countrymen.

One of COIN's main initiatives aims at extending the reach of the Afghan government, which is exactly what this mission accomplished. With the district chief being engaged in the Shura and showing his interest in the entire district, he connected the populace to the Afghan government at the lowest level.

At the conclusion of the first mission, the various key leaders conducted an after action review to assess the mission.

Coalition forces concluded that USSF's inconspicuous and unobtrusive manner during the shura assisted Afghan forces in having an active role in the meeting. The force also agreed that Afghan-led meetings/missions demonstrate the Afghan leadership's ability to govern.

The ANA district commander said it is important for his forces to learn from the people living in the area and to seek out local village leadership for advice.

With the success of the first mission, the key players were assigned the same task for the next mission brief. This time the Surri sub-district ANA and ANP were assigned the lead roles and the District ANA and ANP would act as mentors.

During the mission brief the following morning, the Surri ANP explained the route his men would use to lead the convoy. With the district chief, the ANP would request permission to conduct a shura. The ANP would provide security during the shura.

After picking up the district chief at the front gate, the 43-truck convoy departed. By the time the last truck was at its security position, the Surri ANP had already secured the village and the district chief had begun the shura. As members of the ODA and other coalition forces joined the shura circle,

the village elder handed a folded piece of paper to the 4th Kandak commander.

The note was delivered hours earlier by two men on motorcycles with AK-47s. The note ordered the villagers to discontinue using cell phones, to no longer speak to coalition force units and to refrain from using any paved roads or Dab Pass to travel to the district center.

"There were just two men," remarked the district chief, "Why didn't you stand up to them?"

"We are a village of 23 families," the village elder retorted, "even if there was only one armed man, we could not stand up to him."

The enemies of Afghanistan tend to operate more frequently in villages that are poverty stricken, lack nearby ANSF or CF support and are unable to defend themselves, the USSF team leader clarified.

"What's great about having the right Afghans in the right room with the right [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan] leaders is information gathering," said the USSF team leader. "The fact that this village of 23 families was unable to stand up to two men on motorcycles representing the enemy is ground truth and the type of information everyone, to include the ANSF and district chief, needs to hear."

After the ANA commander photographed the letter and placed it in a sealed plastic bag to undergo further analysis, the district chief continued the shura with the village elders. The district chief asked the elders if they were willing to send one of their men over Dab Pass to attend the weekly shuras at the district center.

An elder threw his hands in the air and asked, "What man is so brave?" His gesture

unexpectedly caused a lot of nervous laughter.

The elders concluded after some debate that if Dab Pass is secure, they will travel to the district center for the weekly shura.

Before finishing the shura, the village elder asked the ODA team leader if he would like to speak.

"The future of Afghanistan is in your hands," the ODA team leader said, pointing to the Afghans. "If the GIROA is going to work, you have to support it." The villagers nodded silently in agreement.


The Afghan and international military both aim to defeat the remnants of the Taliban by securing the population and extending the reach of the government. Both non-lethal missions contributed to accomplishing that goal, and they did so with the Afghans in the lead.

While Afghan and coalition forces both learned the practical application of current counterinsurgency and conducted two combined missions to physically see the benefits of Afghan-led missions, the road ahead will still be long and difficult.

COIN will continue to be challenged by Afghanistan's rugged terrain, the ANSF's resourcing and the challenges of understanding the different areas needed to develop situation-specific approaches.

COIN can be successful in Afghanistan if the ANSF and CF continue to mentor each other and conduct population centric, COIN-specific operations that continually expand white space and push GIROA out to the people, even if only one village, one district at a time.

SGT Debra Richardson is currently serving with the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan Media Operations Center.



BATTLE IN THE DEATH ZONE

High-Altitude Mountain Warfare in Operation Chumik

CPT NATHAN FRY

In April 1989, mountain soldiers from the Pakistani and Indian armies collided at an elevation of 22,158 feet on a battlefield where the dangers of the environment outweighed those of the physical enemy. Called Operation Chumik by Pakistani Army planners, the battle involved a Pakistani technical mountaineering assault of an Indian strongpoint on Point 22158, a key peak overlooking the Gyong La Pass, in an attempt to seize decisive terrain and unlock the stalemated Siachen Glacier War.

Although the Indians and Pakistanis were both experts in high altitude mountain warfare, the Pakistani commander of Operation Chumik, LTC S.M.Y Naqvi, defeated both the enemy and the dangerous environment through his superior use of mountain terrain, his ability to employ standard mountain warfare doctrine at previously untested altitudes, and his small unit leaders' aptitude for synchronizing technical mountaineering with maneuver.

The war on the Siachen Glacier began with a tactical race of operations by India and Pakistan to secure the high ground in a strategically important region. As a result of a diplomatic failure to complete the boundary between the Pakistani and Indian sections of Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier region of the Karakorum Range remained "a source of dispute between India and Pakistan" for over 30 years due to the region's geostrategic importance as an avenue of approach into the contested Kashmir and into Central Asia, according to Pradeep Barua in *The State at War in South Asia*.

On 13 April 1984, after intelligence reports indicated that Pakistan planned to move a military force onto the glacier, the Indian Army responded with Operation Meghdoot, an air assault operation that deployed two infantry battalions, inexperienced in mountain warfare, onto the key passes of Bilafond La, Sia La, and Gyong La (Eric S. Margolis, *War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet*). In accordance with



Figure 1

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

standard mountain doctrine, the Indian commander established strongpoint defenses on the Saltoro Ridge on the southwest border of the glacier, overwatching the Pakistani approaches into the Siachen region (Nikhil Shah and B. Bhattacharjee, "Manning the Siachen Glacier," *Bharat-rakshak.com*). Thus, when the Pakistani forces arrived a week later, they found their passage onto the glacier blocked by an Indian brigade holding the tactically superior ground on the Saltoro Ridge (Barua). What followed over the next year was textbook mountain warfare

— both sides emplaced artillery positions to support their operations, established lines of communication between base camps in the valleys and the observation posts on the ridges, and began a war to attempt to gain or retain the key terrain on the Saltoro Ridge (Shah).

Within a year of the first battle, the race to gain higher ground on this ridge forced both combatants to apply mountain warfare doctrine to previously untested altitudes and terrain. While the first battles on the Siachen occurred at 19,000 feet, by June 1987 the

deadly game of vertical leapfrog placed an Indian observation post in the Bilafond La sector at 21,600 feet (Barua). In April 1989, Indian forces moved to replicate their successes at Bilafond La Pass by seizing Point 22158, a towering peak of 22,158 feet overlooking Gyong La Pass. Pakistan, already on the defensive in the Bilafond and Sia La sectors, countered with a daring plan to seize the summit and gain the advantage on the southern Siachen Glacier (Syed Ali Ishfaq, *Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen*).

The race to the summit of Point 22158 began in February 1989 when Pakistani helicopter reconnaissance flights began to observe a troop and supply buildup at the Indians' Baniya Post in Gyong La's Chumik Sector. The Indian objective clearly centered on establishing posts higher than the existing dominant Pakistani positions (Sher Observation Post [OP] and Victor OP) that overlooked Indian supply lines on the southwest side of the Chumik Glacier. With Sher and Victor already entrenched at approximately 19,000 feet, the Indians planned to counter by moving higher up to Point 22158 and entrenching their OPs in a position to call indirect fire on the Pakistani sector and force their withdrawal. In early April, the Indians succeeded in establishing a string of positions — Ganga, Sadhu, and Agra I OPs — leading up to the summit of Point 22158 from the southern and eastern (Indian) approaches. They subsequently established a second OP, named Agra II, on the northern side overlooking the Pakistani Sher and Victor OPs, and supplied both Agra posts by helicopter from a helipad located on the southern side of the peak. However, because of the rugged final ascent to the summit of Point 22158, the Indians were slow in establishing a permanent presence at the top. LTC Naqvi, Pakistani regimental commander for the Bilafond and Chumik Sector, immediately capitalized on the delay and began plans for Operation Chumik to "beat the Indians" to the top of Point 22158 (Ishfaq). The perilous Chumik Saddle, he decided, would be the key to success in the daring plan.


By 15 April, LTC Naqvi had decided on a plan of attack. Reconnaissance flights with high altitude Lama helicopters revealed

that, although the Indians had already ascended near the summit with mountain teams, they neglected to place observation on the risky southwest approach from the Chumik Saddle. Thus, Naqvi identified the saddle as the weak point in the Indian defense and planned an envelopment operation to gain the peak. His plan directed one mountain team of 12 men to ascend the thin but obvious avenue of approach along a ridge that approached Point 22158 from the north. This team, the fixing force, was to divert enemy attention at Agra I and II away from the main assault and prevent enemy repositioning by using direct and indirect artillery fire. Simultaneously, a second mountain team, the assault force, was to climb through the labyrinth of ice and rock on the western face of the mountain to the unguarded Chumik Saddle, their approach hidden from the observation of Agra I and II. Gaining the Chumik Saddle was the decisive point of Naqvi's plan, as the route's technical challenges would provide an unlikely avenue of approach for the assault force to move undetected to the summit, fire onto the western flank of Agra I and II, and destroy the Indian threat at Point 22158 (Ishfaq). Additionally, with his position on the top of the peak consolidated, Naqvi would have a "vantage point [from which] to pound [the] lower Indian base [at Baniya] with mortars and rockets," according to Tim McGirk in his 4 May 2005 *Time* article "War at the Top of the World." His contingency plan was to continue the envelopment, but with a risky air assault. In the event the first option failed, Naqvi would have high-altitude Lama helicopters prepared to airlift a small contingent of officers and NCOs onto Chumik Saddle to seize the decisive point and then move to the summit of Point 22158 to finish the operation (Ishfaq).

The operation began on 15 April 1989. The fixing force of 12 mountaineer soldiers, led by Pakistani CPT Tariq, moved east from base camp, ascended the knife-edged northern ridge towards Victor and Sher OPs with ice axes and crampons, and turned south to follow the ridge to the summit of Point 22158. Simultaneously, Pakistani CPT Kauser led his assault force of 15 mountaineer soldiers from the base camp and moved south towards the Chumik Saddle,

traversing through "huge gaping crevasses and sharply rising ice walls" with "pickets ... pitons ... and ropes" (Ishfaq). A day later on 16 April, Kauser established "Kauser Base," the point that served as a comparatively safe advance base camp on the steep slope as the team established a series of bivouacs leading towards the Chumik Saddle. Moving at a speed of sometimes no more than "ten meters ... in two hours," Kauser's force crept into the dead space on the western face of Point 22158 as friendly artillery fire prevented the Indians at Agra II from engaging the laborious ascent to the Chumik Saddle (Ishfaq).

However, the constant barrage of shells, while suppressing the enemy, created an entirely different adversary for CPT Kauser and his team. On the evening of 18 April, after three days of creeping towards the Chumik Saddle, Kauser's assault force established a bivouac for the night just meters below their decisive point. Camp K-III, as the bivouac was named, was completely safe from enemy engagement.



The Siachen Area Relative to India and Pakistan, Brigadier Asad Hakeem and Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal

Figure 2 — A Satellite Image of Contested Area With Key Passes

Unobservable from Agra I or II, Camp K-III not only prevented the Indian OPs from engaging Kauser's assault force with fire from small arms and artillery, but also obscured the Pakistani direction of attack. With the fixing force's slow progress up the northern ridge drawing fire from Agra II and mortar fire from the Pakistani base suppressing Agra I, the assault force's ascent up the saddle to the summit was guaranteed the element of surprise. The conditions were nearly set to conduct the final assault on Point 22158. Yet as the soldiers rested that night, the "sharp crack of a shell exploding ... jarred the snow loose from its bedrock," creating a massive avalanche that engulfed the tents of Camp K-III and "buried [the soldiers] under tons of snow," killing the members of the assault force (Ishfaq). In an instant, the ground option for the envelopment had failed and forced LTC Naqvi to attempt to seize the saddle with a risky air assault.

Within 12 hours of the fatal avalanche, Naqvi and the task force commander were prepared to execute the daring contingency plan. A Pakistani captain and NCO, "[hung] from a tiny [Lama] helicopter by a rope," would drop onto "a flat extended ledge ... almost hidden from view" on the saddle's knife-edge ridge and establish a foothold (Ishfaq). By the evening of 19 April, four days into the attack, a Lama had inserted the initial assault element, CPT Naveed and Sergeant Yaqub, on a small ledge just below the summit of Point 22158. Unable to surmount a formidable ice cliff and make the final climb to the top of the peak due to an injury Yaqub sustained during the drop, the pair began to call artillery fire onto Indian OPs on the south side of Point 22158 and engage opportunity targets with small arms. Through radio intercepts, it became clear that the Indians were now aware of the Pakistani summit attempt and were rushing to push a team of reinforcements to the top of Point 22158 (Ishfaq). Yet worsening weather forced the Pakistanis to temporarily halt the operation, leaving Naveed and Yaqub to fight frostbite and altitude sickness on the Chumik Saddle. On 22 April, after three days of blizzard conditions that dropped temperatures to -55 degrees Fahrenheit, a Pakistani climbing team and assault team began to arrive by helicopter at Naveed's camp on the saddle. By this time, Captain Tariq's fixing force on the north

ridge reached Camp T-III, a vantage point from which they could engage Agra I and II with small arms and indirect fire, and now attempted to distract Indian attention away from the main assault up the Chumik Saddle. The assault climbing team, commanded by CPT Kamran, quickly set to work fixing ropes to ascend the "huge ice wall" that had stopped Naveed — the last barrier between the Pakistani assault team and Point 22158 (Ishfaq). The ascent took the better part of the day, with the team progressing only "50 meters ... [after] several hours," and by nightfall, the assault force, unhindered by enemy fires, topped the wall and established a camp on the false summit, or "Kamran Top" (Ishfaq). The following morning, 23 April, a hasty reconnaissance revealed scant enemy presence — only one OP guarded the saddle that separated Kamran Top from the true summit. Composed of only a machine gun team and radio with a small bivouac tent, it seemed that either the Indians had not yet arrived in force at the summit or were simply careless in emplacing sufficient protection against a Pakistani assault. From its vantage point, the OP could observe the Indian avenue of approach along the fixed ropes ascending Point 22158 from the Indian advanced base camp, but it could not monitor the Pakistani approach from the Chumik Saddle onto the summit. Yet a better position would not have helped the OP to repel a Pakistani attack, as the assault force found the OP silent, the inhabitants huddled inside their shelter for warmth. MAJ Bilal, the commander of the team that arrived to augment CPT Kamran's assault force, quickly created a plan for "a raid, quick and decisive in action," to eliminate the Indian presence near the top (Ishfaq). Shortly before nightfall on 24 April, the raiders established an attack-by-fire position with rockets and machine guns and commenced fire on the Indian OP. The raid destroyed the OP within minutes. MAJ Bilal ordered the fixed ropes from Indian base camp cut, thus preventing Indian reinforcements from ascending the summit for a counterattack, and then withdrew the raiders back to the safety of the camp at Kamran Top under the cover of friendly final protective artillery fire. Firmly entrenched on Point 22158, the Pakistani assault force proceeded "to pound [the] lower Indian base on the glacier with mortars and rockets" before "a blizzard, match[ing] the intensity of the guns" halted

operations for four days (Ishfaq). On 28 April, after the blizzard passed, Bilal and Kamran confirmed that their raid, coupled with indirect fire and the weather, had destroyed the Indian OP on Point 22158. On 13 May, following negotiations between the Indian and Pakistani force commanders, the hard-won Pakistani positions on Point 22158 forced the Indian army to withdraw its OPs from the Chumik Sector, leaving the Pakistanis in control of the Gyong La Pass. (Ahmad Ishtiaq, "Siachen: A By-Product of the Kashmir Dispute and a Catalyst for its Resolution," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*.)

An analysis of the events leading up to the battle reveals that it was not for lack of training that the Indians lost Point 22158 to the Pakistanis. FM 3-97.6, the U.S. Army's doctrinal publication on mountain warfare, explains that "the level of uncertainty, ambiguity, and friction is often higher [in the mountains]" because "most units do not routinely train for or operate" in such a rugged environment. However, with specific regiments permanently responsible for garrisons in the Siachen region, both Indian and Pakistani commanders "well understood ... the pattern of warfare in [the Siachen Glacier]" (Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Armies, and the Wars Within*). Both countries' soldiers and officers regularly trained at either the Indian Siachen Battle School or the Pakistani Glacier Warfare School, learning the geography of the battlefield, the technical mountaineering skills needed to maneuver in the region, and the altitude's effects on the ballistics of rifle bullets, artillery shells, and rockets. To account for the rarified air and human susceptibility to Acute Mountain Sickness at high altitude, both the Indian and Pakistani armies required replacements to acclimatize in stages as they ascended to the high camps. Supply lines and lines of communication were well established on both sides, allowing for regular resupply and relatively efficient communication to the high altitude observation posts (Barua). Most significantly, each side understood that the primary "method of maintaining freedom of action is to seize or hold key terrain ... that is higher than that held by the enemy" (FM 3-97.6). The difference in the two armies lay in the fact that, although both sides had developed technical proficiency in the mountains, LTC Naqvi, the Pakistani

commander in the Gyong La sector, had apparently mastered the more difficult ability to apply doctrine and tactics in a mountainous environment. This key difference provided the basis for Pakistani successes in Operation Chumik, despite superior Indian positions and setbacks from the environment.

Thus, while the Indian commanders understood that high ground is dominant and moved quickly to seize Point 22158, LTC Naqvi and his staff dissected the high ground, discovered weaknesses in the enemy defensive plan, and found ways to wrest the dominant terrain from Indian control. According to FM 3-97.6, “terrain normally favors the defender,” who will seek to overwatch the most dangerous avenues of approach to his strongpoint with direct and indirect fire. In the case of the defense of Point 22158, the Indians followed this doctrine, establishing Agra I and II to watch the easiest, and thereby most threatening, approaches onto the summit. However, the Indian commander neglected to place forces to overwatch the unlikely technical approach from the Chumik Saddle, over the ice cliff, and onto Point 22158 from the west. In doing so, he neglected a key tenet from FM 3-97.6 that “using rough, unlikely routes ... helps [the attacker] avoid detection” and achieve the surprise needed to conduct an envelopment, the “form of maneuver of choice” for mountain offensive operations. Naqvi, acting on intelligence from helicopter reconnaissance flights, planned to capitalize on the Indian commander’s obvious blunder. The Pakistani commander realized that this “use of vertical terrain [provided] a distinct advantage to [his] operation” and correctly identified the seizure of the Chumik Saddle as the operation’s decisive point.

After correctly identifying the enemy weakness and the decisive point that supported the exploitation of the Indian defensive flaw, the Pakistani commander then proceeded to further develop his maneuver and fires plan to guarantee the success of his attack. His finished product held the best of tactical mountain doctrine — “bold and imaginative,” it sought to gain success “with smaller forces ... using deception ... surprise actions, and [decisive] terrain to ... attack the enemy ... where [he] was weakest or unprepared” (FM 3-97.6). First, Naqvi planned the direction of CPT Kamran’s main assault through the dead space formed by the plunging western face of Point 22158. By sending Kamran’s assault force through this unlikely route, he would expose them to a greater danger from the terrain but protect them against enemy observation, direct fire, and indirect fire. Next, Naqvi further strengthened his envelopment plan by sending CPT Tariq’s fixing force along the more obvious route along the northern ridge, clearly under the observation of Agra I and II. Not only did the fixing force serve as a base of fire to support the assault force’s seizure once they gained the summit, but it also doubled as a deception force to draw Indian attentions even further away from the assault force’s ascent of the unguarded Chumik Saddle. A fire support plan supported the operation, targeting enemy artillery batteries and the OPs encircling Point 22158. Using observers from other Pakistani OPs that surrounded Point 22158, the Pakistanis integrated long range artillery fire onto Indian gun positions in the Siachen Valley with high angle mortar fire onto the Agra OPs that guarded the fixing force’s approach. With the enemy threat to his forces thoroughly mitigated, Naqvi then turned to overcoming the even more unpredictable threats inherent in high-altitude operations.

Even in the most thorough plans for mountain operations, the harsh battlefield environment often ranks above the enemy threat

Even in the most thorough plans for mountain operations, the harsh battlefield environment often ranks above the enemy threat as the major point of failure.

as the major point of failure. To completely appreciate how the environment affected the soldiers involved in Operation Chumik, it is necessary to first understand the effects of altitude, weather, and mountain geography. FM 3-97.6 classifies elevations into five categories, labeling the highest zone, with peaks above 18,000 feet, as “extreme” and explaining that “with acclimatization, soldiers can function for *short* periods of time.” Yet the FM fails to account for the transition into a final altitude stage at some point between 22,000 to 23,000 feet. This altitude, called the “Death Zone” in the mountaineering community, is the point at which no human body can acclimatize (Don Graydon and Kurt Hanson, editors, *Mountaineering: The Freedom of the Hills*). A mountaineer or, in the case of the Siachen, a soldier who passes this deadly altitude will slowly begin to die due to a lack of oxygen. The body’s metabolism slows down radically, thinking and reasoning are impaired, and the body slowly loses its energy to conduct strenuous activity (Ed Viesturs, *No Shortcuts to the Top*). Complicating matters was the mountain geography that the soldiers had to traverse to accomplish their mission. The Saltoro Ridge, as part of the Karakorum Range, is a part of a mountain chain that boasts the most difficult mountains to climb in the world. The slopes in excess of 45 degrees, rocky ridges no more than a foot wide with thousands of feet of vertical drop, avalanche chutes, and terrible winds and storms make the region a consistently fatal area in which to conduct recreational mountaineering. For the mountaineer-soldier, the threat of hostile enemy actions interfering with highly sensitive technical maneuver over deadly terrain increased the danger and possibility of failure exponentially (Kevin Fedarko, “The Coldest War,” *Outside Online*).

Consequently, the environment of Operation Chumik clearly illustrates the mountain field manual’s claim that small unit leaders and soldiers often begin fighting the environment rather than the battle, focusing solely on negotiating difficult terrain rather than maneuvering to accomplish a tactical mission. Yet success in the mountains depends on the unit’s ability to fight both the enemy and terrain simultaneously. The first step occurs in the planning process, when commanders must assist the mountaineer-soldier in completing the mission with proper terrain analysis and risk mitigation. Naqvi’s creation of a contingency plan indicates a proper assessment of terrain – he recognized that his “use of an unlikely avenue of approach” also exposed him to “a much greater risk from the terrain” and possible failure of the mission (FM 3-97.6). Yet he also understood that the success of the operation relied on seizing Point 22158, making it necessary to “capitalize on the harsh environment as a force multiplier” and accept the risk in his approach to the decisive terrain at the saddle. The first step in risk mitigation involved attempting to preserve Kauser’s assault force from destruction by the environment. CPT Tariq’s fixing force, moving up the slightly less technical north ridge route, would draw Indian attention and thereby allow the assault force freedom from enemy engagement to concentrate on overcoming their perilous route with proficient mountaineering operations. In the possibility that Kauser’s assault force failed

to ascend to the Saddle, either due to terrain or enemy, Naqvi planned for a contingency operation to air assault a force onto the Chumik Saddle. The use of helicopters, an even riskier option than mountaineering due to wind conditions and thin air, underscores Naqvi's acknowledgement that the failure in the ground approach would necessitate a rapid execution of the contingency to make up for lost time. Sending another team by foot would spell almost certain failure for the contingency force commander. If the assault force's failure was a result of enemy engagement, there would be an Indian reserve defending on the Chumik Saddle by the time the second team attempted to ascend. If terrain conditions, namely avalanche or slope dangers, foiled Kauser's team, it would be suicide to send a second assault team along the same route. Thus, helicopters, "the only means of rapid transportation" in mountain operations, would be the centerpiece of his contingency plan (FM 3-97.6). With the plan complete in its consideration of enemy and terrain threats, it now lay in the hands of Naqvi's subordinate leaders to execute and achieve success.

Naqvi, by issuing "an uncomplicated plan with a well-thought-out intent," set the proper conditions for his small unit leaders in Operation Chumik — MAJ Bilal and CPTs Kauser and Tariq — to exploit battlefield opportunities in conjunction with traversing the most dangerous mountain terrain in the world. The leaders and soldiers in the operation, well trained

in mountaineering skills and seasoned with combat experience, successfully combined tactics with technique to overcome both enemy and terrain. In the initial attempt at ground envelopment, Kauser and Tariq used proven mountaineering methods in their approach to their respective fixing and assault positions. Their actions illustrate the principle of mountain doctrine that "no terrain is impassable," but must only be considered in terms of the team's mountaineering ability versus the obstacle's vertical difficulty. To maintain focus on threats from both the terrain and the enemy, the assault team task organized into an assault element and a porter element. The team's porters accomplished "the arduous job of fixing ropes" using ice screws and pitons (large nails pounded into rock) to cross difficult traverses or ascend cliffs while the assault team concentrated on the approach to the Saddle, force protection, and preserving strength for the tactical mission (Ishfaq). Both the fix and assault forces ascended their respective routes by establishing a series of camps at increasingly higher altitudes, much as civilian mountaineers do when they climb Everest and K2, with the mountaineer-soldiers taking care to bivouac in areas safe not only from avalanche, but from enemy observation and fires as well (Graydon).

Finally, in possibly the greatest tribute to their mountaineering skills, the leaders took steps to mitigate the dangers of high altitude ailments such as frostbite, pulmonary edema, or cerebral edema and, when necessary, used their string of camps to escort the casualties off the mountain back down to treatment at base camp. Despite threats from the altitude and cold, the fixing force, upon reaching the limit of their ascent, was still intact and able to "direct accurate mortar fire on the enemy" in support of the assault force (Ishfaq). Likewise, even after the assault force's air assault onto the thin saddle, bivouac through the snowstorm, and consequent labors to scale the ice cliff at 22,000 feet, the team was still capable of completing its mission. In the rarified air with thousands of feet of vertical drop surrounding them, dressed in multiple heavy layers to ward off the cold, and carrying full combat loads, MAJ Bilal's assault force of mountaineer-soldiers still managed to "raid the enemy machine guns posts" and direct mortar fire for several days before ultimately winning the battle and forcing the Indian units out of the sector (Ishfaq).

Ultimately, the Pakistani ability to defeat the adversity of the enemy and environment through a superior use of terrain, maneuver, and technical mountaineering created the conditions for success in Operation Chumik. Although exact casualty numbers after the operation are questionable, with Pakistan claiming six dead and 44 wounded, the fact that most casualties resulted from environmental injuries such as altitude, cold, and avalanche is a tribute to the tactical soundness of the plan and the ground leaders' ability to execute in the most difficult conditions. Although it was ultimately untenable to hold Point 22158 due to altitude and rigor of climate, the Pakistani victory forced Indian bases out of dominant positions in the Chumik Sector and allowed Pakistani dominance of the Gyong La Pass.



<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karakoram>

The Karakoram Range is home to some of the world's tallest mountains including K2.

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A FLANKING DETACHMENT IN THE MOUNTAINS

LESTER W. GRAU

Introduction

Defending mountain terrain has its own challenges. Mountains offer good observation, but the terrain also blocks observation, particularly close up. Mountains offer good long-range fields of fire, but mountains are also full of dead space and concealment. Mountain defenses are not continuous, but are normally separate outposts and fighting positions which may be mutually supporting, but usually are not. They are often not even in the same plane. Mountain fighting positions are difficult to construct and maintain. Mountain fighting positions can be stockpiled with ammunition, but food and water quickly run out at these positions and are normally supplied in the villages and hamlets down in the mountain valleys and canyons. Consequently, in Afghanistan, the Mujahideen usually congregated in the valley except when they felt threatened. Some security was maintained at the fighting positions, but this was usually slack without indications or intelligence of enemy actions.

Attacking in the mountains has its own set of problems. First, the enemy holds the high ground and, if he has occupied the area for any time, he has had time to establish fighting positions and emplace long-range crew-served weapons such as mortars, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and even direct-lay artillery. He has had time to reinforce the defenses with mines and other obstacles. Entries into the mountain valley or canyon are limited and liable to interdiction by a skilled defender. Still, the irregular mountain terrain offers distinct advantages to the attacker. The enemy is seldom able to mass fires, and the terrain offers numerous concealed attack approaches to defending positions. Enemy withdrawal will be by small groups and will often be forced to abandon heavy weapons, ammunition stockpiles and wounded.

Too often, during the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet attacks in the mountains were frontal attacks. The Mujahideen response was to kick out a rear guard and exfiltrate. After a lot of effort and the expenditure of much artillery fire and aerial ordnance, the Soviets found themselves somewhat in control of a mountain that they had no intention of garrisoning. The Mujahideen had lived to fight another day. The following article describes the Soviet use of a flanking detachment to seize high ground within the depths of a Mujahideen defense located in the mountains. The attacking troops were

paratroopers. Soviet paratroopers were trained and equipped to fight as both mechanized infantry and light, airborne or air-assault infantry. Each regiment had its complement of armored personnel carriers, assault guns or tanks, artillery and sappers.

"A Frontal Attack ... Is Not Recommended" by Major V. A. Selivanov, *Armeykiy Sbornik (Army Digest)*, October 2009

In April 1985, according to intelligence reports, there was a significant grouping of the armed opposition concentrated in the Mazlirud and Kakh Canyons. Their number was estimated at 1,200. Besides assault rifles, this group had 35-40 DShK heavy machine guns and up to 15 ZU anti-aircraft machine guns as well as mortars, recoilless rifles, and rockets. The main body of the enemy (400-600 men) was located in the village of Malakhairu. The general situation was complicated by the fact that earlier large-scale operations in the area showed that surprise was not possible and that, other than the casualties inflicted, the results were insignificant. The main body of the enemy, as a rule, managed to withdraw from the canyon before our troops arrived. The enemy had managed to establish a significant, well-constructed system of observation and early warning. Further, this region was particularly unsuited for air assaults and military vehicles could enter the canyon only on one road which ran through Mazilishakhr, Zagan and Malakhairu.

Considering the peculiarities of the region, during planning, our battalion commander determined to carry out the mission in the following fashion. We were briefed at an officers call that at 1330 hours on the 9th of April, the bronegruppa of the main



Department of Defense photo

An Afghan Mujahideen demonstrates a handheld surface-to-air missile.


body would move from its base camp along the road from the south with the mission of closing in to the village of Mazlishakhr by 1800 hours. My parachute company was ordered to support the departure and movement of the march column. Then, after the column had passed, my company was to return to garrison to carry out guard duty. The combat action to destroy the enemy

grouping was planned for the 10th and 11th of April by moving the bronnegruppa to link up with its paratroopers who would move from the west into the valley.

However, at noon on the 7th of April, my regimental commander, without any witnesses, gave me an order for a totally different plan. The new mission was as follows: At 1600 hours on 8 April, my parachute company would serve as a flanking detachment, and without attracting any attention, would secretly move to the region of Khakfakhai village in order to conduct a route reconnaissance for movement through the Afedshakh Pass. With the advent of darkness, I would leave my combat vehicles on the road, go on foot through the pass, enter into the Mazirrud valley and, by dawn, occupy positions on Khaduzan Mountain. At dawn on 9 April, I would be in position to adjust artillery fire and direct close air support with the goal of creating panic among the assembled Mujahideen and not allowing them to exit the canyon before the main body struck them. While carrying out this mission, very strict attention had to be paid to the secret movement and independent actions since it would be impossible to support my detachment in case we were discovered.

At 1800 hours on the 8th of April, my company was assembled in the designated area near Khakfakhai village. Soon, our observation disclosed that groups of armed men periodically moved on the path through the Afedshakh Pass. There was also a group of eight Mujahideen located in a guard post on that very same pass. Everything appeared calm in the target area. Everyone discussed it and agreed that the “ghosts” [Mujahideen] were not expecting our force. With the onset of darkness, we conducted a radio check with our armored vehicles and our higher headquarters and then I gave the order to begin movement.

We crossed through the pass by 2200 hours, bypassing the guard post to the south without drawing the attention of the Mujahideen. During night time, this post was a main [security] link. They were tied in with other posts using a complex system of varying signals. Even though these “stinkers” were one of the [security] links, we bypassed them literally in 15 minutes.



Map 1

Just as we began to descend into the canyon, we lost radio contact with our company bronnegruppa and with our higher headquarters. By all rules of military science, I must immediately either restore communications or return. But then our company's combat mission would not be accomplished. Therefore, I made a decision to continue to move and to restore communications once we reached high ground. I had to make this decision because I knew that if the Mujahideen discovered our company at night, we could only count on ourselves for help.

From the depths of the canyon, we heard the noise of night firing. We were convinced that the Mujahideen were not expecting an appearance of our force and had occupied their fighting positions to sort things out [conducted an alert]. At midnight, we entered the hamlet of Gusak. This is where I, the company commander, made a mistake that might have compromised all our measures for secrecy. Despite the ample number of night-vision devices that we had, we discovered too late that there were two Mujahideen patrols that we barely avoided running into. Taking necessary precautions, we lost about two hours before we exited the village. At 0300 hours, the company assembled at the foot of Khaduzan Mountain.

The heavens were clear and things were now visible thanks to the appearance of the moon. This additional lighting “worked” to the enemy's advantage and forced us to hurry up. The first platoon, commanded by Senior Lieutenant A. Mikenin, climbed the mountain. After an hour, he reported that his platoon had occupied positions on the heights. I placed two platoons, under the command of Senior Lieutenant V. Plotnikov, in an ambush directed against the hamlet of Gusak, and I followed the path of the first platoon to the top. We established our primary observation post on height 2705.0. I placed Lieutenant Mikenin's platoon on the northern slope and I placed the other two platoons on the southern slope. From these positions, they could also

interdict paths on the eastern side and partially on the western side, while blocking enemy bands located in the hamlet of Gusak.

At 0500 hours, we were prepared to carry out our mission. At that time we were able to reestablish radio contact. An understrength paratrooper company had secretly crossed 12 kilometers of enemy-controlled territory, assembled in the rear of a strong enemy force and taken the commanding heights. It should be noted that the secret movement of the company was key to the success of the action and the complete lack of company casualties.

On the morning of 9 April, the bronnegrupa of the main body of the battalion inconspicuously passed through the village of Mazilishakhr and began to enter the canyon. Instantly, the signal (three individual shots) repeatedly rang from the mountain slopes from the north to the south and even the west. It announced the arrival of our force. Some 15 to 20 minutes after the signal, a band of 120-200 men emerged from the hamlet of Gusak and began to advance on my company. When the Mujahideen were close to our second and third platoon positions, my paratroopers opened up on them with deadly fire. It caught the enemy completely by surprise and inflicted such heavy casualties on them, that they were unable to offer resistance. The "ghosts" panicked and ran back into the hamlet.

At this point, I should note that the sun was in our eyes and it was hard to find the enemy. After five minutes, the Mujahideen suddenly launched an attempt to break out of the canyon to the northeast. I called artillery fire on them. Again, after a half hour, they attempted to bypass the company to the north and up the southern slope of height 2946.6, but they came under the fire of Senior Lieutenant A. Mikenin's platoon.

From 1400-1500, we conducted two tactical air assaults [with the remaining two companies of paratroopers] on the western side of the canyon. The [bronnegrupa of the] main force, by this time, had already pushed through the hamlet of Gusak. The company's mission was over.

Thinking over our combat action as a flanking detachment in the mountains of Afghanistan, I have arrived at several conclusions. First, in order to conduct combat in similar circumstances, it is necessary to plan to assign an element of the combat formation to be a flanking detachment. It will be able to secretly enter the flank or rear of the enemy without engaging in combat with small subunits and guard posts. It will be able to prevent the enemy withdrawal, hit him with a surprise attack to destroy him and his capabilities in order to facilitate the successful mission accomplishment of the main force.

The experience of conducting such operations shows that most successful flanking detachments are company-sized. Use well-trained subunits and personnel in forming the detachment.

Second, the nature of mountainous terrain prevents small subunits from carrying heavy weapons and ammunition. At the same time, it is necessary to have sufficient fire power to conduct effective fires at various ranges. Besides our assault rifles and sniper rifles, my company carried one AGS-17 and a heavy machine gun. In every squad, we had one AKM assault rifle with the under-barrel grenade launcher. Our ammunition

Going into the mountains is critical to gaining the initiative and bringing the fight to the enemy's sanctuary ... Flanking detachments are an excellent way to shape the battlefield and hold the enemy in place for punishment.

load was 600-700 rounds per assault rifle and 1200 rounds for the machine gun. Our special gear included some night-vision devices.

The successful actions of a flanking detachment in the mountains is dependent on close, well-planned coordination with the forces and resources of the senior commander. Of primary importance is the support of artillery and aviation as well as agreement on the action with the main force before it departs to carry out its mission. Thus, in the course of combat it is impossible to fulfill the mission without reliable uninterrupted communications. Experience shows that in order to guarantee communications, it is better to establish retransmission stations or simply to use aircraft that are equipped for retransmission.

In conclusion, selection of company-grade officers for assignment to a flanking detachment requires care. You know that they will be required to make independent mission decisions while separated from the main body on unfamiliar territory that is controlled by the enemy. This requires detailed planning and thorough preparation as well as a high degree of individual training. In part, it is absolutely necessary that the commander has concrete experience working with maps, can quickly detect objectives in the mountains, determine the necessary data for their destruction, precisely direct the fires of his subordinate units, and skillfully use all possibilities for secret and sudden actions.

Discussion

In this article, the Soviets conducted the apparent main attack with their armored vehicles moving into the canyon on the only road. This attack included the personnel carriers of two paratroop companies, attached tanks, and an attached battalion of self-propelled artillery. There was little infantry in this attack. The two airborne companies that the armored vehicles belonged to conducted an air assault approximately six hours after the beginning of the supposed main attack to eliminate Mujahideen positions in the west and then to move into the canyon to link up with their vehicles. Helicopter gun-ships provided close air support to the air assault. The flanking detachment, which had inserted itself into the depths of the enemy position was particularly useful in calling in artillery strikes and defeating an enemy advance and an enemy withdrawal attempt. Although the article provides no casualty figures, the flanking detachment suffered none while the Mujahideen did.

There are some interesting aspects to this attack. The flanking detachment left its armored personnel carriers (bronnegrupa) at the dismount point. It was responsible for its own security and served as a mobile reserve in the event that the flanking detachment got into trouble, but once the flanking detachment was deep into enemy territory, the reserve role was problematic. A self-propelled artillery battery joined the bronnegrupa for the attack the following morning. The Soviets had entered this war

with a limited ability to conduct split-Fire Direction Center operations. By 1986, this capability was well developed. Soviet artillery usually accompanied the ground attack since it was more accurate than jet-aircraft in support in the mountains. Further, the artillery was often used in direct-lay against a stubborn enemy.

The flanking detachment was not part of the original battalion planning and was controlled by regiment. In the interests of operational security, the company's role and presence were not disclosed to the rest of the battalion. The company was basically on its own for at least 15 hours except on-call artillery and close air support. Both require communications and were iffy at night. Communications were a problem and remain such in the mountains despite modern technology. Mountains absorb radio waves and distort GPS signals. Satellite communications are spotty and a savvy opponent could jam the GPS and satellite telephone receivers in the mountains. Ground retransmission units are hard to move, emplace and defend and retransmission aircraft are few and seem to go down for maintenance at critical points.

The Infantryman's load remains a problem and in Afghanistan, where the bulk of engagements are beyond 500 meters, small-caliber supersonic bullets fired from short-barreled carbines are ineffective. The fight devolves to the machine gunners while the rest of the platoon tries to get involved. The Soviets issued the AK-74 with the thought that the Infantryman could now carry more ammunition. Where possible, units such as this airborne unit, went back to the longer-range, medium weight 7.62 cartridge. Still, the weapons that the airborne carried did not give it an advantage over its opponent. The airborne's position on commanding terrain did.

Going into the mountains is critical to gaining the initiative and bringing the fight to the enemy's sanctuary. Still, bulling into the mountain valleys and canyons without securing high ground or establishing a blocking force is futile. The lightly-equipped enemy will withdraw over familiar territory leaving his burdened attacker behind. Flanking detachments are an excellent way to shape the battlefield and hold the enemy in place for punishment.

SMALL SECRETS OF GREAT MOUNTAINS

LESTER W. GRAU

Introduction

Usual military mountain training focuses on individual climbing skills such as placing pitons, rappelling down slopes, tying knots, ascending and descending steep rock faces or crossing loose fields of scree or shelves of snow. Armies, however, do not fight as individuals. They fight as units and so mountain training should concentrate on unit movement and unit fighting in the mountains. Units should learn to climb, to fire and to maneuver by teams, squads and platoons. The people who support the infantry — the gunners, the sappers, the logisticians and the transporters also need training in mountain movement and mountain combat skills. It is particularly beneficial when they accompany the Infantry for this training. Ikram Nazarov is a mountaineer instructor/trainer with over 40 years experience in military mountaineering. He was involved in training Soviet units for mountain combat during the Soviet-Afghan War and has trained Russian units for the mountains of Chechnya. Now he is working with the Army of Uzbekistan imparting mountaineering skills. He published the following article in the May 2008 issue of the Russian *Armeyskiy sbornik* [Army Digest]. The article demanded translation so that it can reach a wider audience. Although the Russian Army and the U.S. Army train and fight differently, there is much in it that is of use to the American mountain soldier.

"Small Secrets of Great Mountains" by Ikram Nazarov, *Armeyskiy sbornik* (Army Digest), May 2008.

In the mountains, the time set to depart on a mission and to return to camp is law. If a group of mountain soldiers has not returned by the deadline, it is an emergency, and dozens, if not hundreds, of people will have to work under extreme conditions to find the "lost expedition." In general, there are strict laws in the mountains: discipline above all; never leave a comrade who has fallen off a rock face; and, if you have to, sacrifice your own life to save him.

Another rule is that the shortest soldier always leads the column and everyone else keeps in step with him. In the mountains, the pace of movement depends on stride length. If a column is led by a soldier who is six foot six, his stride length will be a lot for even for a person of average height to keep up with. A trailing short soldier will have to run, not walk. The soldier at the end of the line will soon begin to lag behind, which, by the way, is absolutely forbidden. Remember, the pace of movement must always be the same throughout the column.

Your right and left legs have different stride lengths, so in the dark or in a thick fog you will always move a little off the track. Therefore you have to adjust the direction of your movement frequently.

Mountain sickness can be a problem. There is only one way to deal with it — soldiers must train regularly at altitude over several years. Only a person who is physically fit, acclimated, and trained to fight in the mountains need not fear this sickness.

Remember, do not leave any trash whatsoever behind. It is fairly easy for an experienced enemy to determine that your unit is there and how large it is from discarded items, chocolate wrappers, and empty cans. It goes without saying that the enemy should not even guess that your group is in the mountains on a combat mission until the very last moment.

Get your soldiers accustomed to mountain wind, foul weather, sun and frost. Only then will your soldiers look on foul weather as an everyday occurrence.

This is a factor for victory in battle. Foul weather is always an obstacle to your enemy as well.

You must train your soldiers so that they automatically select the best sites and firing positions. Small-arms firing is difficult in the mountains. It is difficult to fire accurately from one rock face at another, since you have to factor in meteorological conditions and your distance perception is distorted in the mountains.

Remember that the best position for firing in the mountains is the prone position. You should always press as hard as possible against the rock face so that you are almost invisible. If, however, you decide to shoot while sitting or standing, a good shooter is sure to spot you and you can be sure he won't miss. The mountain units of foreign armies have spent years developing a well-worked-out technique for training Jägers.

What gear should you take to the mountains? The law here is to take only the absolute necessities. Anything extra is going to be a drag on you both on the march and during the fight. I know from experience that when you first come into contact with the enemy, you will not be able to assume a firing position rapidly, much less change it. So all these jumar ascenders, descent and arresting devices, pretty backpacks with hundreds of pockets, artificial warmers, and Chinese flashlights are simply going to end up discarded in the mountains.

Remember that your gear should depend on the mountain terrain and how you're your target is located. In a combat situation, you should take a climbing rope, a 20-25 foot reepschnur, two-three carabiners, a pair of climbing irons, glasses, and a pick. The carabiners are used for descent and for a lot more. The reepschnur can be used in lieu of jumar ascenders and descenders, and the pick can do everything: cut out steps in the ice, chip a stone off a rock face, arrest a fall from a rock face, or kill the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.

Be cautious about using imported gear. I know from experience that foreign carabiners such as the French- and German-manufactured Irbit have failed when someone falls

from a rock face, if the gate has to bear the load. Remember that there is nothing better or more reliable than our Abalakovsky carabiner.

Footwear is important. In 1959, I hiked to the 22,906-foot Revolyutsiya peak in ordinary felt boots and was comfortable, but when I went up the face a second time in shoes, my feet were cold. You need to choose climbing footwear very carefully, especially when going 16-20,000 feet or higher. Above all, remember to put Tricouni nails on your hiking footwear. For example, some soldiers in Afghanistan's mountains did not put on Tricounis because they are fairly heavy and seem awkward at first. Many of these soldiers paid for this with their lives. And you will not, by the way, find better footwear than Tricouni.

With regards to cosmetics, remember that veteran mountain soldiers do not need creams, ointments or lip balm for protection against sunburn or the wind. It is only over time that wind and sun "harden" the skin and lips stop chapping. That is why I recommend that it is better to take a first-aid kit with a good variety of medications instead of cosmetics.

Under no circumstances should you take alcohol with you on a mission to the mountains. The popular belief is that it warms you up in extreme cold. Take my word for it, this is an illusion. A person who has been drinking, and is tired after a long march to boot, will sleep like the dead in the cold and will not realize that he is freezing to death.

Remember to always have a sentry in the mountains. This is critical for ensuring that you accomplish your mission and return alive. Vigilance must be at the highest level. Anyone who fought in Afghanistan knows a lot of examples of weary soldiers assigned to sentry duty who fell asleep while on watch. The result was that the sentry, along with the unit, never did wake up: the Mujahideen slaughtered the sleeping soldiers like sheep, without firing a single shot.



And the main thing, in the mountains the commander should always be the most experienced and respected person. At least that is how it should be. Disaster is inevitable otherwise. The commander's professionalism as both a soldier and a mountaineer should therefore be head-and-shoulders above any rank-and-file soldier. This is the guarantee that all his orders will be carried out without fail.

The professionalism of the rank-and-file soldier is something that he gains only through years of hard combat training and systematic drills, as well as in marches and tactical exercises. In the final analysis, this is how all soldiers learn teamwork.

Remember that there is yet another rule in the mountains. Each soldier does what he is better at doing than anyone else. The soldier who knows about radio equipment is in charge of the radio and communications. Another soldier can always manage to light a fire in the mountains. He is in charge of campfires and oil stoves. The soldier who is best at stanching blood and bandaging a wounded comrade takes care of the wounded. The best shot has the sniper rifle and so on.

Discussion

Nazarov's tips seem like common sense, but they are common sense developed over 40 years of mountaineering experience. The ancient Roman legionnaires used to call themselves "Marius' mules" [mulimariani]. The Emperor Gaius Marius (157-86 BC) initiated sweeping organizational reforms and greatly reduced the size of the logistics train by requiring each legionnaire to carry his armor, weapons, 15 days of rations (grain) and other gear. This onerous load weighed somewhere between 50 and 60 pounds. The normal day's march was about 20 miles. The Roman Legion spent little time in the mountains. Today, the American Infantryman goes into the mountains of Afghanistan carrying 85 pounds or more of lightweight gear. Afghans jokingly call the U.S. Infantry the "heavy mules." After all these centuries, the soldier's load is still important — particularly in the mountains.

MOUNTAIN RECON — RUSSIAN STYLE

LESTER W. GRAU

Introduction

Sensors are wonderful; unmanned reconnaissance planes are great. But sensors cannot detect all activity — particularly in the mountains. Heat sensors can be defeated with a piece of carpet or a space blanket. Motion sensors can be defeated by freezing in place, since many sensor platforms are noisy and readily detected. Sensors should not be the sole basis of tactical intelligence. Human intelligence, derived from the local populace, is an integral part of tactical intelligence. But the best tactical intelligence still comes from boots on the ground. Sensors can identify areas that require a closer look, but the eyes of the skilled scout are still the best way to know what is going on in the folds and recesses of the mountains.

Movement in the mountains is difficult. It is not just the climbing and the effects of thinner air at altitude. The mountains can be a very harsh and unforgiving environment. Observation is not always enhanced by altitude and the distances are difficult to gauge by the novice. Communications and supply are difficult. The following Russian article discusses mountain conditions and movement considerations while scouting in them.

You're Not On The Plains Here: Combat Experience of Reconnaissance Units in Mountainous Terrain by Colonel Michael Panov

How reconnaissance groups move around in mountainous terrain is very different from how they move on level ground. In the mountains, they will encounter rapid rivers, cliffs, impassable ravines, ranges, mountain passes, and icy and snowy slopes. The scouts will face rockfalls and ice or snow avalanches. Severe climatic conditions (hurricane-force winds, thunderstorms, gales) in mountainous areas can negatively impact a reconnaissance group's operational capability since changes in weather fatigue them and the hot sun of the mountains make it hard to rest normally during the daytime.

However, in spite of the scouts' enormous difficulties in the mountains, it is precisely the mountain conditions that provide maximum stealth for setting up camp and moving to combat locations. This material will deal with how to move about correctly in mountain terrain and put its advantages to maximum use.

To operate successfully in the mountains, scouts need to be specially trained in conditions that most closely approximate the conditions of the locality in which they will have to operate behind enemy lines. From the standpoint of ease of movement, mountain terrain can tentatively be divided into: foothills (600-1,800 meters above sea level), mountain (1,800-3,000 m), and high mountain areas (3,000 and above). Although tentative, this division is important when evaluating mountain terrain for reconnaissance actions.

Frequent and drastic temperature change in the mountains produces phenomena that are very dangerous for scouts, which is why they have to be able to use different external signs to identify these phenomena and take timely safety measures. Above all, the scouts must be able to determine in a timely fashion that inclement weather — thunderstorms, gales, snowstorms, etc. — is approaching. Each scout should be familiar with the mountain climate and be able to take timely protective measures.

Solar radiation is much stronger in mountains than on plains and it increases with elevation. Ultraviolet rays greatly affect the human body. Sunburn is possible. The sun's rays harm the retina, causing acute pain and at times even temporary blindness. Sun glasses should be used to protect the eyes. The face should be protected with wide-brimmed headgear or gauze covering mask; breaks and rests should be taken in the shade.

Thunderstorms create the risk of being struck by lightning, especially when scouts are on the crest of a slope, hilltop, or ledge. When a thunderstorm is approaching, you should seek cover in a cave or snow pit. Do not get under single overhanging rocks. Large metallic articles should be set apart and covered during a thunderstorm.

If the situation does not allow the scouts to wait out the storm because they have to “shake off” an enemy tail, they should continue along icy or snowy slopes, where there is less danger of being struck by a bolt of lightning, although a new danger arises – that of ice or snow avalanches.

Thunderstorms are usually accompanied by heavy rain or snowstorms, which makes it difficult and very dangerous to move in the mountains because the grassy slopes (rocks) become slippery. Rain can trigger rock falls and snow (ice) avalanches. You need to move carefully in these conditions and keep a close watch on all sides. It is known that atmospheric discharges more commonly strike tall, solitary trees. To seek cover under them from a thunderstorm is to subject oneself to danger.

Snowfall in the mountains makes it difficult to take one’s bearings and visually monitor the terrain, which could mean falling completely unexpectedly into a deep snow-covered fracture. Snowfall raises the risk of snow slides. Snow can penetrate clothes and cause cold weather injury. It makes sense to seek cover and wait out heavy snowfall.

Special care, belay and self-belay should be practiced if it is necessary to continue to move during a snowstorm. Snow slides are most likely on moderately steep slopes because snow does not usually stick on very steep slopes. There could be slides from smooth rocky slopes as well as from smooth slopes covered by tall grass. With thaw, rain, or a warm wind, the mass of snow that has accumulated in the mountains begins to melt and breaks away, forming wet snow slides. Slide-prone regions can be identified by dug-out channels, broken trees and shrubs, and large piles of snow at the base of a slope. These areas should be circumvented. If it is not possible to circumvent, the snow should be tested for firmness. The recommended method is to move along one route, following in each other’s footsteps, in single file, with more distance (five-six meters) between the men.

If a scout does find himself in a slide, he should do everything to remain on the surface of the moving snow and

immediately close his nose and mouth so as not to be suffocated by snow powder. If, despite his efforts, a scout is engulfed by snow, he should assume a vertical position and work vigorously to make a space for air around his mouth and chest, and then try to burrow to the snow surface by expanding the space.

Thin air is one of the numerous difficulties that are encountered in mountain conditions. Scouts who have not been properly trained or acclimated to the elevation experience oxygen deprivation, which causes “altitude sickness,” accompanied by breathlessness, headache, nausea, vomiting, and so on. Thin air weakens the joints of the arms and legs, which could easily result in dislocation of the leg or arm even from a minor fall.

Rock falls are most dangerous after sunset and in the first few hours after sunrise. Rock fall-prone areas can be identified by rock piles at the foot of slopes, visible furrows from tumbling rocks, and scree and dust on ledges. Dangerous areas should be negotiated quickly, one by one, moving from cover to cover and keeping an eye on the slopes above.

The chief causes of ice avalanches are drastic temperature changes in the mountains and the weight of masses of ice. To be safe, areas of possible avalanches should be traversed early in the morning when packed ice stays in place. These areas should be negotiated quickly and one at a time.

After protracted rain and abundant snow thaw in the mountains, the upper soil layer becomes waterlogged. In some areas there is a build-up of semi-liquid masses of water, sand, pebbles, dirt, rock fragments, and so on. These masses of dirt and stones (mud-rock flow) sometimes slide down the slopes and along the valleys. A mudslide usually moves slowly, but on occasion it can fall without warning, sweeping away everything in its path. It is easy to identify mudslide-prone areas because of the accumulation of dirt, stones, and scree in the mountain valleys and at the foot of slopes.

There are other difficulties in addition to the ones mentioned above, first and foremost orientation difficulties. It is difficult to take one’s bearings in the mountains, even with a map and compass. When choosing a direction on a map, it should be borne in mind that distances measured on a map are roughly 8-10 percent less than in actuality because a map shows a projection rather than the actual distance; neither does it take into account possible deviations from the planned route.

It is difficult and dangerous to march at night in mountainous areas, especially where there are no roads or trails. Moving



along an unexplored path at night could cause casualties.

Prior to a march, the group commander should reconnoiter the route to determine where there could be rock falls or snow or ice avalanches, and where there is cover; how to get over or bypass the hardest sections; where and how to ford mountain rivers (gorges); and where to set up day rests or temporary cover in a storm (thunderstorm).

In addition, the group commander needs to map landmarks that can easily be used at night and figure out the distances to them, as well as adjust route times and map reference points.

Prior to leaving the base area, the group commander should task his deputy or the most experienced scout with carefully monitoring the surroundings (at least two hours), paying particular attention to the direction of the planned march. The group usually sets up an observation post for this purpose on a commanding height to which the scout goes in secret and carries out surveillance with an optical device.

The unique characteristics of marching in the mountains require correct regulation of meals and water intake. The meals of scouts operating in the mountains should be substantial. With the major physical stress, they should receive a hot meal once or twice per day. A strict water intake schedule will keep the scouts combat ready and prevent "altitude sickness."

While on the move, water intake should be limited to small amounts drunk from a canteen. A little bit of salt should be added to the drinking water because water in the mountains lacks salt. It is categorically forbidden to consume ice or snow instead of water.

A successful mountain trek depends largely on preliminary preparation and the group commander's level of experience. When preparing for a mountain trek you should thoroughly examine your footgear, wash your feet and carefully smooth your socks or foot wraps so that they do not chafe your feet; you should lighten your load as much as possible, taking only vital necessities. You should place something soft between the load and your back, and pad the straps of the backpack (rucksack), using grass or moss.

You should breathe evenly while on the move, inhaling only through the nose and exhaling fully. You should not speak when climbing up the mountain and under no circumstances should you smoke. Brief three-five minute stops are usually taken to restore normal breathing rhythm.

Move at an even pace, bending slightly and not straining. When going uphill, tilt the body slightly forward and step on the entire sole without bobbing. When going downhill, tilt the body back and step on the heel so as not to slide or fall (Figure 1).

On steep slopes, your feet should be wrapped in rope or wire, or you should wear specially-adapted footgear to prevent sliding. You should loosen your belt slightly and undo your collar. Your step length should match the steepness of the slope. The steeper the climb, the shorter the step you should take. When going downhill, your step should be increased somewhat.

If the route is not along roads or tracks, you should walk uphill in a zigzag pattern rather than straight upward to make it easier, and "sidestep" or "herringbone." When going over unstable stones, talus, or narrow passes on a precipice, place your sole where there is a toehold and do not remove it until you have placed the other foot forward in a firm position.

Move carefully on steep rocky slopes so as not to kick



Figure 1 — Descent with stick, spade or rope belay

downward rocks that could injury the scouts below. Use a stick on steep slopes. It is a good idea to carve out steps roughly 50 centimeters apart to make it easier to climb on steep, slippery, clayey or icy slopes. Steps can be made by stamping in soft ground or in snow.

When going uphill on a grassy slope, your legs should be moved forward slightly, and the heavier the load and the steeper the slope, the further forward you should lean. When the climb is straight, your feet should be placed at an angle to each other in a "herringbone" pattern. The steeper the slope, the wider your foot angle should be, and the shorter the steps you take. Set your foot down on the entire sole. You should zigzag on long steep grassy slopes, and if the slope is sparsely covered with talus or rocks, you should move more tightly and not kick the talus downward.

All scouts should practice mountain techniques, including those whose units are deployed on level ground. They can use training gorges for this purpose.

Discussion

Colonel Panov's article emphasizes features of mountain movement and climate. Slow is fast in the mountains, and steady, methodical movement, light packs and acclimated physically-fit troops are necessary for mountain patrols. Effective patrols may last for days or weeks. Russian scouts are considered elite forces that perform missions that might be assigned to long-range reconnaissance patrols or special operations forces. Like U.S. forces, scouts are assigned down to infantry battalion level.

Injured or wounded scouts are a problem in the mountains. Scouts frequently move at altitudes that are above helicopter ceilings. During the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets usually committed 12 troops to carry a single casualty down to the point a helicopter could reach the patient. Four men would carry, four would provide security, and four would be ready to take over the carrying mission. A small number of casualties could quickly decimate a patrol.

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Training Notes



The Current State of Military Mountaineering

LTC NATE LORD, MAJ DAVE BRAGG AND SGM (RETIRED) DARREN BEAN

America's Army has been at war in one of the most mountainous regions in the world for more than seven years and is just starting to fully grasp the difficulties involved with conducting operations in this type of environment. Mountains and cold weather coupled with the complexities of today's contemporary operating environment (COE) challenge our units in numerous ways. Altitude and weather impact the effectiveness of fixed and rotary winged aircraft, weapons systems, and Soldier sustainability. Rough and steep terrain limits mobility and degrades communications. Commanders of all units struggle with how to best train and equip their formations for this type of combat. Fortunately, there are resources available to assist in this endeavor. The purpose of this article is to highlight these resources in specific terms of specialized mountain warfare training and equipment.



Courtesy photos

Training

The basic foundation of training for mountain warfare operations as defined by FM 3-97.6, *Mountain Operations*, is the Level 1 Basic Military Mountaineer. This is a Soldier who has graduated from a TRADOC-approved military mountaineer course of instruction and has been awarded the special qualification identifier (SQI) "E" — Military Mountaineer. An SQI E Soldier is trained in the fundamental mobility, survivability, and sustainability skills required to operate in a mountainous cold weather environment. Currently two schoolhouses are authorized to qualify military mountaineers: The Army Mountain Warfare School (AMWS) located in Jericho, Vt., and the U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTCC) located at the Black Rapids Training Site in Alaska. Both institutions have world class, combat-experienced cadre who are eager to pass along their knowledge to deploying units.

Level 1 Basic Military Mountaineer Tasks (IAW FM3-97.6):

- * Characteristics of the mountain environment
- * Mountaineering safety
- * Use, care, and packing of individual cold weather clothing and equipment

The Army Mountain Warfare School teaches both summer and winter basic military mountaineering courses of instruction. The course is focused on the shoot, move, communicate, and medicate skills required to conduct combat operations in the mountains.

- * Care and use of basic mountaineering equipment
 - * Mountain bivouac techniques
 - * Mountain communications
 - * Mountain travel and walking techniques
 - * Hazard recognition and route selection
 - * Mountain navigation
 - * Basic medical evacuation
 - * Rope management and knots
 - * Natural anchors
 - * Familiarization with artificial anchors
 - * Belay and rappel techniques
 - * Use of fixed ropes (lines)
 - * Rock climbing fundamentals
 - * Rope bridges and lowering systems
 - * Individual movement on snow and ice
 - * Mountain stream crossing
 - * First aid for mountain illnesses and injuries
- Units deploying as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)

would be well served to have several Soldiers qualified as Level 2 assault climbers. Assault climbers are the jumpmasters of the military mountaineering world and are graduates of approved Level 2 mountaineering courses.

Schools

The Army Mountain Warfare School teaches both summer and winter basic military mountaineering courses of instruction; graduation of either course qualifies Soldiers for the SQI E. The course is focused on the shoot, move, communicate, and medicate skills required to conduct combat operations in the mountains. The course is 15 days long. Additionally AMWS conducts two Level 2 courses per year, one in summer and one in winter. Recently AMWS has added several OEF-focused injects into the basic course program of instruction (POI) to include animal packing, field expedient aerial resupply, high angle fire live-fire exercises, and soldier load management. Mobile training teams and specially tailored unit training packages are available upon request. Students gain access to AMWS through the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS) school code 959.

The U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center training facility in Alaska provides a training environment with terrain and weather strikingly similar to that of the mountainous regions of Afghanistan. NWTC courses include the 15-day Basic Mountaineering Course, which qualifies Soldiers for the SQI E, the 15-day Level 2 Assault Climber Course, the 13-day Cold Weather Leader Course and the four-day

Cold Weather Orientation Course. NWTC also provides unit MTTs and tailored training packages available upon request. Students gain access through ATRRS school code 699.

Military Mountaineering Equipment

A standard set of equipment to operate in the moderate to high-angle mountain environment has been lacking for many years. Except for rope, webbing and carabiners, units have had to locally purchase equipment "off the shelf." This has resulted in varied equipment that does not meet our subdued requirements. Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier is currently working to fix that. Product Manager Soldier Clothing and Individual Equipment (PM-SCIE) has conducted extensive testing on equipment. From this testing, derived from a set of requirements to update the Special Operations Forces Mountaineering Equipment (SOFME) set, they have developed three separate kits designed to enhance the mobility of the Soldier in the mountains.

The High Angle Mountaineering (HAM) Kit is designed to enable a minimally-trained Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) platoon to move through steep rock-covered terrain. The kit has enough commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) harnesses, carabiners, rope and webbing to allow the Soldiers to move over rope installations established by trained assault climbers. Each individual kit weighs under two pounds.

The Assault Climber Team (ACT) Kit is designed to provide a trained three-man assault climber team the harness, carabiners, rope, webbing and rock protection necessary

to establish rope installations such as fixed ropes for follow-on Soldiers.

The Snow and Ice Mobility (SIM) Kit is designed to enable a trained IBCT platoon to operate in steep snow and ice covered terrain. It includes enough COTS snowshoes, crampons, ice axes and avalanche safety equipment to enhance their mobility and keep them safe.

All of this equipment will be as subdued as technology allows, built in coordination with the U.S. Marine Corps mountaineering kits and will take advantage of existing products all certified by the highest industry standard.

Operations in mountainous regions create some of the most challenging combat conditions that our Soldiers will face. Properly trained in mountain warfare skills and equipped with state of the art military mountaineering equipment, our units will be better able to focus on the mission at hand not the weather or terrain. The U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School, the U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center, and PEO Soldier stand ready to assist deploying units in taking the fight to the enemy.

Contact Information

U.S. Army Mountain Warfare School — Contact AMWS Operations at (802) 899-7202 or e-mail through the AMWS Web site at <https://www.infantry.army.mil/amws>.

U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center — Contact NWTC Operations at (907) 353-1364/1165 or e-mail through the NWTC Web site at <http://www.wainwright.army.mil/nwtc>.

POC for U.S. Army Military Mountaineering Equipment is SGM (Retired) Darren Bean at darren.bean@us.army.mil or (508) 233-5840.



Properly trained in mountain warfare skills and equipped with state of the art military mountaineering equipment, our units will be better able to focus on the mission at hand.

LTC Nate Lord commands the Army Mountain Warfare School and previously commanded 3rd Battalion, 172nd Infantry (Mountain). He is a 1991 ROTC graduate of the University of Maine and veteran of Operation Enduring Freedom.

MAJ Dave Bragg commands the U.S. Army Northern Warfare Training Center and previously commanded companies in the 82nd Airborne Division. He is a 1998 ROTC graduate of the Colorado School of Mines and veteran of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom.

SGM (Retired) Darren Bean is the Mountaineering Equipment Project Officer for PEO Soldier, a retired Soldier, and was previously the Sergeant Major/Chief Instructor of the Army Mountain Warfare School.

The Army TS Enterprise: A New Paradigm for Training Support

ARMY TRAINING SUPPORT CENTER

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effective means of preserving peace."

— GEN George Washington

Since the Revolutionary War, the U.S. Army has prepared its Soldiers to conduct their wartime missions through extensive training. That training has often required some type of training enablers — whether people, facilities, products, or services — which allow Soldiers to meet the training standard under conditions that closely replicate the conditions they would encounter during their mission. Today, we refer to those enablers as “*training support*.” More specifically, we define training support as encompassing —... *the training information infrastructures, products, materiel, personnel, services, and facilities to enable integrated training and education. Training Support develops and sustains leader, Soldier, and civilian competencies and enhances unit readiness across the institutional, operational, and self-development training domains in an integrated training environment.*

While the look and feel of training support has changed significantly because of the continuous and significant advances in technology, the intent — to ensure Soldiers and civilians have the training enablers necessary to prepare them to accomplish their missions during both war and peace — has not. This becomes increasingly challenging as we continue to operate in complex environments that require innovative training and training support solutions to ensure our Soldiers’ and civilians’ success, whatever their mission.

One of the first steps in ensuring relevant training support solutions is establishing a comprehensive Army TS Enterprise that provides relevant training support capabilities that are responsive to the needs of Soldiers, civilians, leaders, and mission/combatant commanders and ensures Army readiness.

What Is An Enterprise?

Army Regulation 25-1, *Army Knowledge Management and Information Technology*, defines an enterprise as “The highest level in an organization; it includes all missions, tasks, and activities or functions.” This definition can be applied to the TS Enterprise as it represents the entire organization of training support, including all of the processes, actions, and functions necessary to develop and deliver integrated, operationally relevant training support capabilities.

While the Army currently has a Training Support System (TSS) Enterprise, it is limited in scope. It is comprised of the Sustainable Range Program (SRP), Integrated Training Area Management Program (ITAM), Soldier Training Support Program (STSP), Battle Command Training Support Program (BCTSP), and the Combat Training Center (CTC) Modernization Program. These

programs are managed collectively and include many training support capabilities, including ranges, instrumentation, training aids, devices, simulations, simulators, services, and personnel.

As broad as the current TSS Enterprise appears to be, it represents only a portion of all the training support capabilities that have grown over the past 10 to 15 years and even those on the horizon. Some of the other programs and their capabilities that should form the Enterprise include, but are not limited to:

- * Army Training Information System (ATIS);
- * Distributed Learning (dL) products and services;
- * Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) for ammunition;
- * Training development, delivery, and student management processes and tools; and
- * Mobile learning and interactive multimedia capabilities.

Although this is not a complete list, it does represent an expanded view of what the enterprise must encompass to provide comprehensive training support.

Why Do We Need an Expanded Enterprise?

The advance of information technology, the demands of an era of persistent conflict, and the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model have necessitated a change in training support capabilities and how that support is executed — from providing essentially institutional and home station training support capabilities to mobile, reconfigurable, integrated, and interoperable capabilities to Soldiers and civilians anytime, anywhere. Most of the training support capabilities of today do not have these characteristics.

The capabilities of the existing enterprise are often developed independently within functional “*silos*,” resulting in training support solutions that are redundant and not interoperable, integrated, or reconfigurable. For example, capabilities for classrooms are developed independently, based on the type of facility, such as a distributed learning Classroom XXI, Digital Training Facility (DTF), or Institutional Battle Command Arts and Sciences Program (I-BASCP) classrooms. While they all serve as classrooms and require networked infrastructures and facility support personnel, they are developed in parallel because they are funded through different programs and their purpose and audience may be different. These training support facilities typically compete for limited resources and do not provide the most efficient responses to current and future force requirements.

Without TS Enterprise processes that eliminate stovepipes and enable integration and synchronization of capabilities, we will continue to develop inefficient training support solutions that are not fully responsive to the needs of the customers. Applying the TS Enterprise solution to the training facility example should result in the development of fewer facilities at a lesser cost with more varied capabilities to support several different purposes and audiences.

How Do We Get There?

The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recognizes these shortcomings and has designated the Combined Arms Center (CAC) to lead the effort to establish a holistic, integrated approach for managing training support through the expanded TS Enterprise.

CAC is taking steps to ensure an expanded TS Enterprise becomes a reality. The first key step is educating those involved in training support on the *who, why, what, when, where, and how* of the enterprise. It is conducting meetings and briefings with many of those involved at all levels to describe the TS Enterprise, communicate the value added, establish responsibilities, and gain consensus. This effort will encourage leaders to take a holistic view of TS Enterprise objectives, processes, and resources and empower them to act cohesively to integrate related training support functions.

Additionally, CAC and others in the training support community have begun working together to define the governance processes that are critical to ensuring that objectives are achieved, risks are managed appropriately, and resources are used responsibly. The governance processes will provide the means to bring together TS managers and others involved in training support under a single umbrella

to collaboratively identify like requirements and opportunities for leveraging capabilities across programs and lines of operation (LOOs). Specifically, the governance processes will:

- * Ensure training support capabilities are linked with approved training strategies.
- * Provide a means to holistically identify gaps and eliminate redundancies.
- * Establish forecasting, validation, prioritization, and integration criteria for program capabilities.
- * Establish metrics that focus on outcomes.
- * Synchronize varied processes and schedules with important Army drivers, including resourcing and policy decisions.
- * Enable resource-informed decisions at the lowest possible level.
- * Provide the analytics to enable rapid decision-making by leaders to adjust to mission, technology, and funding changes.
- * Establish reporting requirements and processes that provide total asset visibility across the enterprise.
- * Apply Knowledge Management strategies and applications to enable rapid decision-making and identify second and third order effects of decisions.

But even with education and well-defined governance processes, establishing the TS

Enterprise is a complex process that will not happen overnight. This broad undertaking includes a myriad of challenges that involve developing, delivering, and sustaining relevant training support capabilities. The greatest challenge, however, is change.

Establishing the enterprise will require extensive systematic and synchronized activity to ensure the most efficient and effective use of limited resources. It will require conscious, deliberate actions by the many players who are committed to ensuring training support is continuously acquired, managed, maintained, sustained, and disposed of in the most effective and efficient manner possible. And it will require leadership commitment, guidance, and support to ensure those involved in the enterprise judiciously execute their responsibilities.

With everyone working together, the end result will be a TS Enterprise that distributes available resources to achieve the optimal balance between effectiveness, efficiency, and strategic risk. It represents a new paradigm for training support to better enable Army readiness and respond to the needs of Soldiers, civilians, and leaders anytime, anywhere.

Soldiers run towards the military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) site during warrior task and battle drill training on Chievres Air Base, Belgium, in June 2009.

Pierre-Etienne Courtejoie



RANGER FIRST RESPONDER AND THE EVOLUTION OF TACTICAL COMBAT CASUALTY CARE

SFC CESAR VELIZ, MSG HAROLD MONTGOMERY AND DR. (LTC) RUSS KOTWAL

In 1996, the official journal of the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States, *Military Medicine*, published a supplement titled “Tactical Combat Casualty Care in Special Operations.” This supplement, written by U.S. Navy CAPT Frank K. Butler Jr., Army LTC John Haymann and Navy ENS E. George Butler, altered the course of pre-hospital combat medicine into what we know today as tactical medicine. The authors brought to the forefront the vast differences between providing pre-hospital trauma care in the civilian setting and providing pre-hospital trauma care at the point-of-injury on the battlefield. Using data collected from Vietnam, and more recent conflicts such as the Battle of Mogadishu, the authors presented an alternative solution to providing tactical pre-hospital trauma care at the point-of-injury within the military and the Special Operations community.

Military pre-hospital providers were not provided with treatment protocols and interventions that were relevant to the parameters of actual combat or tactical scenarios. What’s best for mission success and what’s best for the treatment of casualties may be in direct conflict, a quandary completely unique to combat or tactical medicine.

The three goals of Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) are to treat the casualty, prevent additional casualties, and complete the mission. These three goals combined mission tactics and medical care into recommended guidelines and protocols for a standard of care to be provided in the battlefield setting. The publication of the TCCC article in 1996, coupled with a 1998 directive from the 75th Ranger Regiment’s commander (then-COL Stanley McChrystal) for all Rangers to focus on four priorities, provided the necessary spark needed to refine the Combat Lifesaver (CLS) program and develop it into the Ranger First Responder (RFR) program of instruction in 1999. The Ranger First Responder program continues to be updated regularly to reflect lessons learned during the conflicts over the past decade as well as recommendations from the Committee on Tactical Combat Casualty Care and the U.S. Army Institute for Surgical Research.

The “Big Four” are the most important areas of command emphasis for all Rangers and comprise marksmanship, physical training, medical training, and small unit tactics. In 2006, the “Big Four” became the “Big Five,” when mobility was added to this list of priorities. The emphasis on medical training incorporated in the “Big Four” afforded the opportunity for medical personnel from the 75th Ranger Regiment to use the new TCCC guidelines and apply them to the CLS program, the Army standard at the time for non-medical “first-aid” care. TCCC guidelines and protocols focus on the care of casualties in a combat or tactical environment at the point-of-injury. RFR is a program of instruction that incorporates TCCC and better prepares non-medical Rangers to provide self-aid or buddy-aid in the absence of a medical provider. The RFR course

Although RFR has grown to include eight critical steps, the emphasis is still on the treatment of three preventable combat deaths: massive extremity hemorrhage, tension pneumothorax, and airway obstruction... The mastery of these critical skills can truly make a difference in the survivability of casualties on the battlefield.

uses a combination of didactic and hands-on instruction which culminates in an application of skills during scenario-based trauma lanes. Although RFR has grown to include eight critical steps, the emphasis is still on the treatment of three preventable combat deaths: massive extremity hemorrhage, tension pneumothorax, and airway obstruction. The idea is that a Ranger doesn’t need to be able to perform surgery, but rather he should be a master of the basic treatment for these three medically preventable causes of death within the guidelines of TCCC.

The mastery of these critical skills can truly make a difference in the survivability of casualties on the battlefield. The number one medically preventable cause of combat death is hemorrhage from an extremity wound. Most casualties who have died on the battlefield have done so within minutes of being wounded. Ranger First Responders are taught to immediately control bleeding and apply a tourniquet when confronted with massive arterial bleeding from an extremity wound. Controlling the bleeding first, with aggressive application of a tourniquet when needed, is in contrast to historical civilian medical protocols. Civilian protocols have traditionally taught managing the airway first and then moving on to breathing and circulation concerns. When presented with massive arterial bleeding, a secure airway is inconsequential if there is no blood left in the body to transport the oxygen being provided by a properly managed airway. Thus, controlling the bleeding first is a vital intervention that saves lives on the battlefield and as such is meticulously rehearsed and reinforced during RFR training.

After controlling the extremity bleed with a tourniquet, Rangers are taught to use hemostatic dressings and pressure dressings. Hemostatic dressings are impregnated with chemical agents that assist with the human body’s natural clotting factors. Along with the tourniquets and other medical supplies and equipment used by Rangers, hemostatic dressings continue to evolve and change as medical research improves and refines these medical technologies. The emphasis on controlling bleeding within the 75th Ranger Regiment is also apparent in internal standard operating procedures as every Ranger has been directed to carry a Bleeder Control Kit that is carried in a standardized location on his body. This allows the casualty or other first responders to easily locate and apply a tourniquet, pressure dressing, or other intervention as required and ensures that medical supplies are appropriately distributed and

readily available to all who are wounded. This standard operating procedure was mandated by the regimental command sergeant major (CSM Michael Hall) in 2000, and was the precursor and a model for the Army's current Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK). Also at that time, the regimental CSM directed that the Bleeder Control Kit contain the Ranger Casualty Card in order to document pre-hospital injuries and care rendered. The Ranger Casualty Card was the precursor and a model for the Army's current Tactical Combat Casualty Care Card, DA Form 7656.

The second most common medically preventable cause of combat death is a tension pneumothorax, which is pressure that accumulates within the chest cavity that affects the lung and vital organs. RFRs are taught to manage this injury by applying an occlusive dressing to the entry and exit wounds. They also learn to assess for the signs and symptoms of a tension pneumothorax, and if present, to perform a needle decompression of the chest. A needle decompression procedure entails using a 14 gauge, 3.25 inch long needle catheter to pierce the chest wall and provide immediate decompression of the chest cavity, allowing the lung to properly inflate and taking pressure off of the vital organs. Although not the definitive treatment for a tension pneumothorax, a needle chest decompression is a simple procedure that can immediately relieve the build-up of pressure in the chest cavity and buy time for the casualty to survive and be evacuated to the next level of care.

The third most common medically preventable cause of combat death is related to airway obstruction. RFRs are taught to manage an obstructed airway by using basic manual maneuvers and airway adjuncts. These basic manual maneuvers include simple movements of the head and neck in order to properly align the airway and provide adequate air movement. Airway adjuncts like the Nasopharyngeal Airway are used to help facilitate the airway by preventing the tongue from blocking the air passageway. Along with the ability to assess a patient's airway for patency, RFRs are taught to use critical thinking in order to determine the best treatment for a specific casualty.

The 75th Ranger Regiment provides



75th Ranger Regiment

RFR is not just a medical program; it is the framework of a casualty response system that relies on a mastery and immediate application of basic and critical lifesaving skills by all Rangers.

100-percent RFR instruction to all Rangers, from private to colonel, upon initial assignment to the unit and then annually thereafter with refresher training. In addition to this formal training, RFR is fluidly integrated into training exercises when possible as an integral component of battle drills that are being conducted.

In keeping with GEN Creighton Abram's Charter for the 75th Ranger Regiment, the RFR program has been exported to many units across the military over the past decade. Global implementation of TCCC training coupled with improvements in personal protective equipment have led to the highest casualty survival rate ever during operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

The 75th Ranger Regiment has been continuously engaged in combat operations for the past eight years. As such, the regiment has maintained a constant presence in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003. Although the regiment has sustained over 400 battle injuries during this time frame, including 28 who were killed in action and three who died of wounds, none of these fallen Rangers passed away as a result of pre-hospital medically preventable causes. As the Ranger First Responder has often times been called upon to provide the initial care under fire to a wounded comrade, they have

undoubtedly played a significant role in reducing Ranger morbidity and mortality on the battlefield.

RFR is not just a medical program; it is the framework of a casualty response system that relies on a mastery and immediate application of basic and critical lifesaving skills by all Rangers. However, the success of the RFR program is directly related to line command ownership of the program. Thus, the line commander owns and is responsible for the pre-hospital casualty response system and all line personnel serve as the foundation for pre-hospital care on the battlefield. The RFR program provides the critical tools necessary for a Ranger to treat a casualty. Ranger leaders ensure this training is conducted to standard and is rehearsed and integrated into training events throughout the training cycle. The end result is an increase in Ranger survivability on the battlefield and a successful completion of the Ranger mission.

SFC Cesar Veliz is currently serving as the regimental medical operations NCO for the 75th Ranger Regiment.

MSG Harold Montgomery is the senior medic for the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Dr. (LTC) Russ Kotwol is the deputy surgeon for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. He formerly served as surgeon for the 75th Ranger Regiment.

ARMY OFFERS ELECTRONIC WARFARE COURSES

ELECTRONIC WARFARE DIVISION

Situation: Intelligence indicates that several improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been used in the past three days targeting patrols along the river and that there is a potential IED command and control (C2) node located at the farm indicated on the map.

Mission: The commander wants to utilize all available electronic warfare (EW) assets to protect convoys in the area during a cordon and search operation to locate and capture insurgents near the farm.

Execution: Deny communications between IED teams and the C2, prevent remote-controlled IED (RCIED) detonations, and provide electronic attack against the enemy network.

In the early days of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Army found itself in a complex environment against a threat adept at employing off-the-shelf wireless technologies. These forces were also using global wireless services, cellular technologies, and the internet to synchronize their operations worldwide.

In 2006, the Army decided to begin rebuilding its EW capability from the ground up. GEN Richard A. Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, stated “Soldiers must be trained at all ranks, and at different tiers, in EW skills.” The Army then ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop training for EW officers (EWOs) in every echelon, battalion and above, while developing and resourcing a new electronic warfare career field.

Those initially designated EWOs were sent to Fort Sill, Okla., for a six-week course through the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence. Since 2006, hundreds of Soldiers have graduated from this course and been given the 1J skill identifier. These Soldiers have been deploying to Afghanistan and Iraq performing the important mission of dominating the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). The program has been highly successful at bringing the right training to the right individuals in the right positions prior to deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army is now ready to institutionalize EW as a core competency and has developed the training and infrastructure to support the EW career field. The Army is looking for those individuals who have the requisite skills, interest, and aptitude to join this new field.

Career Management Field 29 - Electronic Warfare

EW will require well-trained and highly skilled officers, warrant officers, and NCOs from the Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard to ensure dominance of EMS on the battlefield both now and into the future. The mission includes locating, targeting, exploiting, disrupting, degrading, deceiving, denying, or destroying an adversary's electronic systems at the tactical, operational, and

strategic levels of the operational environment.

The following are brief descriptions of the four courses designed to meet Army EW needs:

Army Operational EW Course (AOEWC) — ASI 1J

The Army's interim solution of producing skilled EWOs is accomplished with the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course (ASI 1J), a six-week resident course at the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence. The course is designed to give an individual a working foundation of electronic warfare for battalion and above operations. It teaches Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen to integrate and operate as a member of the electronic warfare team.

Each student gains a working knowledge of electronic fundamentals, the integration of EW into the military decision making and targeting processes, how to analyze the electronic order of battle, EW targeting, and assessment of results. Students' knowledge is validated during scenario-based exercises, where they apply their knowledge of integrating electronic warfare across the full spectrum of military operations.

Army Functional Area 29 Course

An EW officer (O3-O6) serves as the principal staff officer for all responsibilities concerning electronic warfare.

This officer integrates EW capabilities to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capabilities. Duties include synchronizing and coordinating offensive and defensive actions within the overall operation; assessing the effects of offensive and defensive EW operations; and integrating EW throughout the operations process to ensure friendly forces dominate the EMS.

The entry point for this field is the Electronic Warfare Officer's Qualification Course, which is a 13-week resident course at Fort Sill. The course provides the education and training in the essential core skills necessary to successfully perform EW functions in support of the commander's concept of the operation. Emphasis is on Army and Joint doctrine as well as current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to prepare EWOs to participate in EW operations at the tactical, operational and strategic levels in a variety of Army and Joint organizations.

Enlisted MOS 29E Course

An EW NCO (E5-E9) — Military Operational Specialty (MOS) 29E — serves as the EW master trainer; supervises and performs military actions to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum; provides technical assistance to support units; maintains and assists in developing the EW staff estimate; oversees EW pre-combat inspections/pre-combat checks; coordinates with and assists the unit intelligence officer (S2) on electronic preparation of the battlefield; coordinates with the unit signal officer (S6) for spectrum de-confliction; and disseminates to the staff and applicable units the EW common operation picture and other relevant EW information.

The qualifying course for the 29E is the Electronic Warfare Specialist Course, a nine-week resident course at the U.S. Army

Fires Center of Excellence. The course provides the education and training necessary to perform in EW positions at the tactical level in a variety of Army and Joint organizations. Emphasis is on Army and joint doctrine, electronic warfare fundamentals, electronic warfare systems, counter RCIED electronic warfare (CREW) operations, maintenance, and troubleshooting procedures, and how to integrate, coordinate, execute and assess electronic warfare capabilities with ground operations across the full spectrum of military operations.

Warrant Officer MOS 290A

EW warrant officer (WO1-WO5) organizes, implements, monitors, and evaluates operations, threat environments, unit maintenance, and intermediate level support maintenance of EW systems. The 290A provides advice on technical and tactical employment of EW systems. Duties include supervising maintenance of EW system equipment and components; monitoring the development of the enemy EW order of battle (OB); processing targeting information and intelligence generated by the OB section; and, assisting in the production and application of target selection standards.

The qualifying course for the 290A is the Electronic Warfare (EW) Technician Basic Course, a 15-week resident course at Fort Sill. The course provides the education and training in the skills necessary to successfully organize, implement, monitor, and evaluate EW operations, threat environments, unit maintenance, intermediate level support maintenance of EW systems and advise on technical and tactical employment of EW systems. Additionally, graduates will learn how to supervise maintenance of EW system equipment and components; monitor development of the enemy EW order of battle (OB); process targeting information and intelligence generated by the OB



Courtesy photo

Students of the Army Operational EW Course gain a working knowledge of electronic fundamentals, the integration of EW into the military decision making and targeting processes, how to analyze the electronic order of battle, EW targeting, and assessment of results.

section; and assist in the production and application of target selection standards.

For more information, visit <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cew/EWCareer.asp> or contact one of the following offices:




- * TRADOC Capability Manager for Electronic Warfare Integration (TCM-EWI) — (913) 684-8538
- * Fires Center of Excellence, EW Division — (580) 442-2832
- * TCM-EWI Personnel Management — (913) 684-9459/9479
- * MAJ Glenden J. Hanun — (580) 442-7303

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Check out the CALL Web site for the latest publications

NIPR: <http://call.army.mil>

RFI: <https://call-rfi.leavenworth.army.mil/rfisystem>



Book Reviews



Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army. By MAJ William C. Sylvan and CPT Francis G. Smith Jr; edited by John T. Greenwood. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 544 pages, 2008, \$50.

Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. O'Sullivan.

The back cover states that during WWII senior U.S. Army generals were often encouraged to keep diaries. This established a double-standard as the rank and file were strictly prohibited from doing this. In addition, their mail was subjected to strict censorship, and that correspondence would have limited value for future memoirs. On the other hand, some senior officers (though not Hodges) were able to supplement their modest retirement by writing best-sellers using these privileged records that they alone were allowed to keep. In the big picture, it may be fortunate that there was this special exception, but it has been the cause of some discontent on the part of those not so lucky.

The book begins with a three-page biological sketch of Hodges. It would have been useful if a bit more had been included. You're left wondering whether there was something in his earlier schooling that led to him being "found deficient" in math at West Point and forced to leave. You also wonder why Patton, who was in the same class, was allowed to drop back to the next year while Hodges was not. The sketch is mostly bare-bones chronology and gives little feel for him as a human being. It does end with a glowing description of his character from Omar Bradley, which should be considered with care because of some built-in bias.


Something else that could have been added (perhaps as a foreword) is a few lines about the previous history of First U.S. Army. It did not spring into existence on 2 June 1944 (when the diary starts); it has a rich background that shaped how it functioned.

The daily summary of activities in the diary is of background value only. It is hard to identify key strategic decisions and personnel actions. More useful are the 124 pages of notes, which do fill in the picture. I only wish they were at the "foot" for easier reference.

Not to be expected in a work of this sort is an evaluation of Hodges as a commander. Other accounts suggest he may have fallen short during the Battle of the Bulge. It is interesting that MacArthur chose him (from the six Army commanding generals in Europe) to join him in the Pacific. He may have made an impression when he was on the staff at West Point while MacArthur was superintendent there in the early 1920s.

There is a good selection of pictures, but the maps would be more readable without the shaded background.

Overall, this is an excellent addition to the story of the U.S.



Army in Europe during WWII. Not many aspire to such a high-level assignment, but this gives an idea of what an Army CG felt was important in dividing up his time in addition to sleeping, eating (often combined with business), going to the latrine, and maybe writing home. Much of what any commander does is imposed by external forces (and it is good to see what these can be), but the priorities set by one's self are revealing.

One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. By Michael Dobbs. NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 405 pages, 2008, \$28.95.

Reviewed by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN.

Michael Dobbs spent his career covering the Soviet Union for the *Washington Post*. In this book, he takes a fresh look at the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, which is perhaps the closest time the United States and the Soviet Union came to a nuclear exchange. Unlike the many other books written about the Cuban Missile Crisis, this is an hour-by-hour and day-by-day account of the 13 days that brought the superpowers to the brink of mutual annihilation. Learning about this crisis is an examination of national leaders, advisors and policy makers operating under extreme pressure. It is an atmosphere where troop movements, overflights, submarine actions, the firing of anti-air missiles, and even diplomatic maneuvers over a cup of coffee represented language that could escalate or de-escalate tensions between Moscow and Washington.

The Cuban Missile Crisis began at 11:50 a.m. EST on 16 October 1962, when CIA Chief Photo Interpreter Arthur Lundahl was in the White House Cabinet Room surrounded by President John Kennedy and 14 of the most powerful men in the United States. Lundahl was pointing out imagery of medium range ballistic missiles in western Cuba. President Kennedy immediately asked when the missiles would be ready to fire and, of course, what to do? These missiles made the eastern half of the United States vulnerable to nuclear strike.


The book details the personalities of the President, Castro and Khrushchev, discussing how each reacted each day and almost by the hour, but also talks about secondary personalities like the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, who served not only as Attorney General but handled the anti-Castro portfolio that included a list of covert actions under the codename "Operation Mongoose." Upon learning of the missiles, the initial reaction was to escalate covert action programs coupled with an increase in surveillance flights.



The Joint Chiefs had plans drawn up to land 120,000 American troops in Cuba, and many pressured Kennedy to invade. To comprehend Kennedy's predicament, the book highlights an exchange he had with former Secretary of State Dean Acheson who recommended the following course: we (the United States) strike Cuba; they (the Soviets) strike Berlin or Turkey; honoring our NATO commitments we (the United States) knock out a few bases inside the Soviet Union; and then hopefully cooler heads would prevail. The bottom line was that it was impossible to know where a limited nuclear war would end.

Fidel Castro's revolutionary zeal reminded old Soviet leaders of their own youth, but to understand how reactionary he was, he dictated a letter to Soviet Premier Khrushchev, recommending that if the United States invaded, not to squander a first strike option and deliver the first nuclear blow upon the United States. Castro was a believer; Khrushchev and Kennedy were the pragmatists. Aside from the R-12 medium range ballistic missiles, there were 45,000 Soviet troops and even Luna short range tactical nuclear cruise missiles landing on Cuban beaches. Each page is dripping with tension as U.S. Navy RF-8 Crusader low level reconnaissance planes are fired upon and a U-2 spy plane is downed. On the high seas, Soviet vessels carrying missile components towards a quarantine line, led to stand-offs between Soviet freighters and U.S. Navy warships; any trigger could begin a nuclear exchange. At the last hour — 9:00 a.m. EST on 28 October 1962 — Radio Moscow announced it would dismantle the weapons and return them to the Soviet Union. What prompted Soviet Premier Khrushchev was a false report that Kennedy was going to address the nation at 5 p.m. Moscow time; the Kremlin thought it was to announce an invasion of Cuba. The U.S. attack was set for Tuesday, with pressure to conduct it on Monday, 29 October. This is a lesson on how events both within and outside our control can influence the course of history. The United States pledged not to invade Cuba and to dismantle obsolete Jupiter missiles based in Turkey within six months.

***A Glorious Defeat: Mexico and Its War with the United States.* By Timothy J. Henderson. NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 216 pages 2007, \$14.**



Reviewed by BG (Retired) Curtis H. O'Sullivan.

This is a tale from a different angle, and there are those who may challenge the title. It may have been glorious in the sense there was protracted resistance to the unprovoked Yanqui invasion.

The Aztec Club of 1847 was formed by Winfield Scott's officers in Mexico City (including my great-grandfather LT George Hooper), but there is no counterpart from the Army of Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.

Most of the available literature on our war with Mexico stresses the U.S. side of the story and is largely about military operations — with some coverage of Nicolas Trist's diplomatic maneuvers.

Henderson tells the tale largely from the Mexican perspective and makes good use of little-known sources. He emphasizes the causes of the war. The first 156 pages are devoted to events before the outbreak of hostilities — going back to the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819.

The cry of the Mexicans at the start of the war (from those who had a voice) was for an honorable peace, future national security, and the erasure of the insult to sovereign pride from the annexation of Texas. The dismal conditions that prevailed in the country in 1846 (as painted by Henderson) offered little hope for a favorable outcome. The \$15 million indemnity in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 may have softened the blow a bit but the loss of 55 percent of national territory inevitably left a bitter taste that persists today — exacerbated by other acts of arrogance and imperialism.

This book is a must read for anyone with a sincere interest in the Mexican War and/or our current relations with that country.


***The Afghan Campaign.* By Steven Pressfield. NY: Doubleday, 351 pages, 2006, \$24.95.**

Reviewed by LTC Keith Everett, USAR.

In *The Afghan Campaign*, Steven Pressfield does a masterful job telling the story of Alexander the Great's invasion of Afghanistan in 330 B.C. The story is told through the eyes of Matthias, a fictional character serving as an infantryman in Alexander's army. Each brutal scene shows readers what life was like for soldiers in those ancient times.

Alexander's secular army was pitted against a devoutly religious people, fiercely fighting to protect their homeland. Alexander won the war against the Afghanistan tribes, but when he moved on to India, he had to leave one-fifth of his Army — about 14,000 men — to contain bubbling insurgency efforts. Two hundred thousand estimated enemy dead did not subdue Afghanistan, until Alexander sealed a long, temporary peace by marrying the daughter of the warlord, Oxyartes. Some bonuses with this story are learning about ancient warfare, strategy and some tactics, while reading a highly entertaining story. Pressfield draws his audience into the story; it's as if a reader is actually marching as a new recruit next to Mathias.

Mathias's story takes our hardening legs mile after dusty mile from Macedonia through the hills and valleys of Mesopotamia and other regions to the mountains and wilds of Afghanistan. Along the way, we learn to fight as a phalanx, using our weapons as our leaders do. Covering about 1,700 miles in four months, we finally catch up to Alexander's army. We practice cordoning off a village and attacking it, driving out the key leaders through a narrow passage for capture. We become part of Alexander's army, not mere readers of a historical novel. Pressfield created this phenomenon, making us eager to learn with his mesmerizing storytelling. Mathias goes on to tell us of Spitamenes, the enemy commander, preparing an ambush and cutting Alexander's forward forces to pieces as they



eagerly pursue him into the hills and narrow trails in the mountains.

The details of house-to-house fighting to rout the Afghans is interesting. The practice of routinely killing of all captives, lined up for throat cutting after the fighting is complete, illustrates there is little effort at winning hearts and minds. The Macedonian soldier is left to deal with his battle-induced psychological problems, simply by drowning memories with fermented drinks of a wide variety, opium and other drugs. Losing soldiers to excessive drink, drugs, disease as well as battle is commonplace and just part of the cost of warfare during the trying times of the invasion into the Afghan mountains.

An incredibly powerful story, *The Afghan Campaign* presents the geography of the area in a manner designed to preserve a memory of the terrain and history. The story is highly entertaining, with vivid images of the perils of ancient insurgency warfare. Pressfield's campaign story is recommended as light vacation reading to military professionals who wish an introduction to the geography of Afghanistan and one of the campaigns of Alexander the Great.




SPC Eric Cabral

Soldiers with D Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, patrols an area in Zabul Province, Afghanistan.

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*** A Guide to Mortar Manning in the BCT
* The CONOP: Emerging Doctrine or Misuse of
What We Already Have?**

